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TORT RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF A CHANCE
David A- Fischer-

"Loss of a chance" is a novel theory of causationcommonly
used by courts in the United States in medical misdiagnosis
cases. Yet, the theory has a vastly broader potential
application than this. In fact, it could be applied in
virtually every case of questionable causation. While this
Article asserts that the doctrine could legitimately be
expanded and applied in a variety of additionalsituations,
the Article cautions that it would be unwise to apply the
doctrine so broadly that it routinely supplants traditional
causation rules. The Article searchesfor a principled basis
for limiting the theory within proper bounds by comparing
the differing applicationsof the loss of a chance doctrine in
British Commonwealth cases and United States cases. The
Article concludes that current rationalesfor the doctrine do
not provide an adequate limitingprinciple, but that a case
by case policy analysis can appropriatelylimit the theory.

I.
INTRODUCTION
Tort lawyers in the United States often think of "loss of a
chance" as a theory of "probabilistic causation" that only applies to
medical malpractice misdiagnosis cases.! The theory is that if a
physician negligently fails to diagnose a curable disease, and the
patient is harmed by the disease, the physician should be liable for
causing the "loss of a chance" of a cure. We shall see that if the
chance of a cure is less than 50 percent, the plaintiff cannot prove by
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University of Missouri-Columbia. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Elizabeth Fischer, Elisabeth Key, Robert Lawless, Phillip Peters,
Robert Rasmussen, and Jane Stapleton who read early drafts of the manuscript
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1. E.g., Margaret T. Mangan, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A
Small Price to Pay For Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REv. 279, 283 (1997); Kevin
Joseph Willging, Note, Falcon v. Memorial Hospital;- A Rational Approach to
Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoLY 545, 545-46
(1993).
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a preponderance of evidence that the negligence caused the harm,
and would recover no damages under the traditional "all or nothing"
rule. Loss of a chance becomes a theory of "probabilistic causation"
if we use it to hold the physician liable for the patient's harm but
reduce any award by the chance that the harm would have occurred
even with proper diagnosis and treatment. If, for example, the
chance of a cure was 40 percent, under a "probabilistic causation"
rule, the physician would be liable for 40 percent of the patient's
harm because the physician deprived the patient of a 40 percent
"chance" of avoiding the harm.
In reality, the loss of a chance theory can have an exceedingly
broad application. We shall see in Part II of this Article that the
theory has two formulations, a narrow one and broad one. Even in
its narrow formulation the theory potentially applies to several very
large categories of cases, including legal malpractice cases, and
cases involving failures to rescue, to warn, to provide safety devices,
and to give informed consent to medical procedures. In its broad
formulation, the theory can apply to all cases where a tortfeasor
creates a risk of harm and it is uncertain whether the harm has
already occurred or will occur in the future. In this broad
formulation, the "loss of a chance" theory provides a basis for largely
substituting "probabilistic causation" for the traditional "all or
nothing" approach to causation.
Some scholars argue for the greatly expanded use of
probabilistic causation in tort cases,' while others disagree. 3 No
court, however, has been willing to expand greatly the use of
probabilistic causation. On the other hand, many courts and
scholars accept the limited use of probabilistic causation by applying
the loss of a chance theory in a narrowly selected range of cases.4
Yet, it is unclear that there is any non-arbitrary way to restrict the
theory to discrete categories of cases. Therefore, courts employing
the limited use of the "loss of a chance" theory are faced with a
dilemma. They must either find a principled basis for limiting its
application, or they create the risk that the loss of a chance
"exception" to the traditional all or nothing rule will swallow the

2. E.g., Samuel D. Estep, RadiationInjuries and Statistics: The Need for a
New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1960); Daniel A.
Farber, Toxic Causation,71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for CatastrophicPersonal
Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984); John Makdisi, ProportionalLiability: A
Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 1063 (1989); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 851 (1984).
3. See, e.g., David A. Fischer, ProportionalLiability: Statistical Evidence
and the ProbabilityParadox,46 VAND. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1993).
4. See discussion infra Parts IV and V of this Article.
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rule, with probabilistic causation completely supplanting the
traditional rule.
This Article will explore the loss of a chance theory with a view
to examining and evaluating the bases for limiting application of the
theory. In doing so, the Article will compare British Commonwealth
cases with United States cases. This comparison is useful in
illustrating the bases for limiting the doctrine because the
Commonwealth cases and the United States cases have taken the
doctrine in dramatically different directions.
In its search for a principled basis for limiting application of loss
of a chance, this Article will proceed by discussing the nature of the
problem in Part H and the major rationales for the use of loss of a
chance in Part III. The Article will apply those rationales to cases
where traditional damage is present in Part IV and cases where
traditional damage is not present in Part V. The Article concludes
that the current rationales provide an insufficient basis for limiting
loss of a chance. In Part VI the Article examines case-specific policy
considerations, and concludes that these concerns provide a more
useful basis for limiting the doctrine.

II.

BACKGROUND
The "loss of a chance" doctrine is best understood in terms of
how it relates to the burden of proving both causation of damage
and causation of harm. Damage is an element of the tort of
negligence and several other torts, such as deceit, that arose out of
the ancient writ of Trespass on the Case.' Damage requires an
actual loss,6 but not all losses are sufficient. Furthermore, certain
losses qualify as damage for some torts but not others. Physical
harm to person or property qualifies as damage in negligence
actions, but some forms of pure mental distress and most forms of
pure economic loss do not.' Yet, in a deceit action, pure economic
loss is damage." Harm, on the other hand, is a broader concept than
damage because it encompasses all loss or detriment.9 It follows
that harm can occur without damage, as where one carelessly blocks
traffic and causes economic loss without physical injury. When a
5. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

30, at 165 and § 7, at 31 n.18 (5th ed. 1984).
6.
7.
446, at
process

Id.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS: HORNBOOK SERIES § 308, at 836 & §
1259 (2001) [hereinafter DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS]. Courts are in the
of liberalizing the traditional ban on recovery for pure mental distress

and pure economic loss-particularly the ban on recovery for pure mental
distress-but even the most liberal jurisdictions engage in line drawing that
excludes certain types of mental and economic harm from qualifying as damage.
Id.
8. Id. § 470, at 1345.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (1965) (defining harm as any
"loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause7).
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tort is actionable because damage has occurred, however, plaintiff
can usually recover for additional harm (such as lost wages in a
personal injury case) even though it does not qualify as damage."0
Traditionally, plaintiff must prove each element of the action,
including damage, by a preponderance of evidence. 1 To prove that a
thing is true by a preponderance of evidence, plaintiff must show
that it is more likely than not true. 12 Writers and judges often state
the matter in probabilistic terms; plaintiff must convince the jury
that there is a greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is
true. 3
While this is a useful short-hand reference, use of
percentages is misleading if not properly understood." Not all
evidence showing that "mathematically the chances somewhat favor
[the] proposition" is sufficient to prove the proposition."
The
evidence must be sufficient to cause the jury to "believe" that the
proposition is true. 6 Evidence, for example, that most serious
automobile accidents are alcohol related is not sufficient to cause a
jury to believe that a particular serious automobile accident was
alcohol related. The jury would need more evidence to form a belief
on the subject.
The rule requiring proof by a preponderance of evidence is not
universal. There are important instances where courts permit an
inference of causation even though plaintiff has not introduced
enough evidence to support a finding of causation. 7 These instances
are quite pertinent to our discussion, and will be discussed later in
this Article. 8
The loss of a chance doctrine arose in the English contracts case
of Chaplin v. Hicks. 9 Plaintiff was one of fifty finalists in a beauty
contest conducted by defendant who had, according to the rules of
the contest, won the right to present themselves to a judge for the
opportunity to win twelve valuable prizes."0 Defendant breached the
contract by failing to give plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to
10. Jane Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt. 1), 104 LAW Q. REV. 213
(1988).
11.

DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 360, at 992-96.

12. Id.
13. Id.

14. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3, at
133 (1995) ("Yet jurors are to determine what actually happened and reveal

truth in the verdict so the language of probability is not entirely congenial to
the aims of the system.").
15. Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945) (quoting
Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940)).
16. Id. at 755.
17. E.g., Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984);
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp. 45 A.D.2d 177 (N.Y. 1974). See discussion infra
Part IV.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. 1911 IB. 786 (Eng. C.A.).
20. Id. at 787.
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present herself.21 Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, seeking
compensation for the loss of a chance to win one of the prizes. The
jury assessed damages of one hundred pounds. Defendant appealed,
arguing that damages were incapable of assessment because they
were too speculative. The appellate court rejected the argument and
affirmed the jury award, holding that the loss of the opportunity to
win a prize was a valuable right, and assessment of damages was a
question for the jury.2 One judge reasoned that because there were
fifty competitors for twelve prizes the average chance of success was
approximately 25 percent, and the "doctrine of averages" could be
used in assessing damages.' Note, however, that the jury award
was considerably less than 25 percent of the value of the prize.
Damage is not an element of the cause of action for breach of
contract. 24 Chaplin v. Hicks used the loss of a chance approach
merely to value harm resulting from a cause of action that was fully
established. Courts in both the United States and Commonwealth
countries also sometimes use this technique for valuing harm in tort
cases where all elements of the tort are established. Suppose, for
example, that defendant clearly causes damage by negligently
breaking plaintiffs knee, but the extent of the harm is uncertain
because the injury creates a risk that plaintiff will develop arthritis
in the knee in the future. Courts often award damages for the risk
of future harm by discounting the recovery for the harm by the
chance that the harm will not occur. Such damages are, in effect,
compensation for the loss of a chance to avoid future harm.
Whether and when to use the doctrine for this limited purpose is a
difficult question, and is discussed in Part IV of this Article.
The even more controversial use of the loss of a chance doctrine
is in tort cases where causation of damage is an element of the cause
of action, and plaintiff cannot prove by a preponderance of evidence
that defendant caused traditional damage. Assume that defendant
makes a fraudulent misrepresentation that causes plaintiff to
refrain from entering into a business venture that had a 40 percent
chance of making a profit. If plaintiff sued defendant for fraud, she
would lose under the traditional approach. Plaintiff cannot prove
that defendant caused damage (economic loss) because there is a 60
percent chance that there would have been no damage. A court
might apply the loss of a chance theory by using a non-traditional
definition of damage. It could do this by adopting the "chance has
value theory" discussed in Part HI. A of this Article. The court
would re-characterize damage as the loss of a chance on the theory
that the chance to make a profit is a thing of value, and the loss of
2L Id. at 788.
22. Id. at 793.
23. Id. at 791.
24. Jane Swanton, ConcurrentLiability in Tort and Contract: the Problem
ofDefining the Limits, 10 J. CoNT. L. 21, 35-38 (1996).
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that chance is economic harm that qualifies as damage. The court
might then value the harm by multiplying the expected profit by the
40 percent chance that there would have been a profit. This use of
loss of a chance is controversial, of course, because some see it as
circumventing the traditional requirement that plaintiff prove
damage by a preponderance of evidence. 5
In cases where traditional damage cannot be proven there are
two formulations of loss of a chance. The narrow formulation
involves a failure to protect a person from a preexisting condition.26
The increasing minority of United States courts that accept loss of a
chance exemplify this formulation. 2 These courts typically apply
the doctrine in medical malpractice cases where the physician
improperly diagnoses or treats a disease. 8 In these cases, plaintiff
suffers from a disease that has some chance of being cured, and the
physician decreases the chance of cure by negligently failing to
diagnose or treat the disease promptly. The following example is
typical:

25. E.g., Vaughn Black, Not a Chance: Comments on Waddams, The
Valuation of Chances, 70 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 96, 98 (1998) (In addressing the
argument that the loss of a chance itself is harm, Black responds that "all cases
of causal uncertainty may potentially be converted into loss of chance cases by
such a redescription of the harm.").
26.

1 DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 178, at 434-38.

See

Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash.
1983). This is a medical malpractice case where defendant reduced decedent's
chance of surviving lung cancer by negligently failing to diagnose the disease in
a timely manner; the court applied loss of a chance because defendant "failed in
a duty to protect against harm from another source." Id. at 477. The doctrine
does not apply to cases where "defendant's act or omission set in motion a force
which resulted in harm." Id.
27. The evolution of the loss of a chance doctrine in the United States has
been traced many times and will not be repeated here. See Darrell L. Keith,
Loss of Chance: A Modern ProportionalApproach to Damages in Texas, 44
BAYLOR L. REV. 759 (1992); Joseph H. King, Jr., "Reduction of Likelihood"
Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of The Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U.
MEM. L. REV. 491 (1998) [hereinafter King, Reduction ofLikelihood]; Dionne R.
Carney, Note, Smith v. State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals:
Loss Chance of Survival: The Valuation Debate, 58 LA. L. REV. 339 (1997); Lori
R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance as Technique: Toeing the Line at Fifty Percent, 72
TEx. L. REV. 369 (1993); Patrick L. Evatt Note, A CloserLook at Loss of Chance
under Nebraska Medical MalpracticeLaw: Steineke v. Share Health Plan, Inc.,
246 Neb. 374, 518 N.W.2d 904 (1994), 76 NEB. L. REV. 979 (1997); Mangan,
supra note 1, at 280-82; Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss of Chance
Doctrine: Legal Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 349 (1999). See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the United States cases.
28.

1 DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 178, at 434-38; Jonathan P.

Kieffer, The Case for Across-the-board Application of the Loss-of-chance
Doctrine, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 568, 576 (1997); King, Reduction of Likelihood,
supra note 27, at 501; Todd S. Aagaard, Note, Identifying and Valuing the
Injury in Lost Chance Cases, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998).
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Medical Misdiagnosis

A patient has stage two breast cancer that if properly treated
can be cured in 40 percent of cases. She goes to her doctor for
a checkup, but the doctor negligently fails to diagnose the
illness. Another doctor diagnoses the illness much later when
the chance of survival is 0 percent, and the patient
subsequently dies. The patients survivor brings a wrongful
death action against the physician.
Plaintiff cannot prove that the first physician caused the
patient's death because there was a 60 percent chance that the
victim would have died even if she had received prompt treatment.2
The physician did, however, deprive the patient of a 40 percent
chance of survival. Under the loss of a chance theory, some courts
hold the physician liable for 40 percent of the damages caused by
the patient's death, and other courts hold the physician liable for all
the damages." Loss of a chance is often justified in these cases
because the physician breached a duty to protect the patient from
the preexisting condition, and the patient would have placed high
value on the chance of a cure even if it was less than 50 percent.3 '
This narrow formulation of loss of a chance actually includes a
very broad spectrum of cases. The essence of the formulationfailure to give valuable protection against an outside source of
danger-applies to many recognized theories of recovery. The
formulation patently applies to all failure to rescue cases. 2 Note
that many cases that we do not ordinarily think of as rescue cases
do, at their core, involve a failure to rescue. Most medical
malpractice cases are really rescue cases because the physician is
29. 1 DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supranote 7, §178, at 435-36.
30. Id. § 178, at 436.
31. Id. § 178, at 436-37.
32. Negligent misdiagnosis cases draw on rescue cases in adopting the loss
of a chance approach. E.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1998)

(holding that loss of a chance is not limited only to cases of medical

malpractice); see also Keith, supra note 27, at 765; Ellis, supra note 27, at 377-

78. One United States case applies loss of a chance in a failure to rescue case.
In Lohse v. Faultner,plaintiffs property was damaged by a forest fire. 860 P.2d
1306, 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). Plaintiff sued a logger for breach of its

undertaking to the Forest Service to patrol the forest for fires. Plaintiff was
unable to prove that if the defendant had conducted the patrol it would have
detected the fire in time to prevent its spread to plaintiffs property. The court
recognized, however, that the loss of a chance theory applies in any case where
"the chance interest was within the range of the duty breached by defendant
and the harm which followed was the type from which the defendant was to
have protected the plaintiff." I& at 1315 (quoting Thompson v. Sun City Cmty.
Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 616 (Ariz. 1984)). Although recognizing that the loss
of a chance theory applies to plaintiffs case, the court denied plaintiffs recovery
because plaintiff could only show a speculative and not a "substantial chance"
that defendant~s omission would have prevented the harm to plaintiffs
property. Id. at 1316.
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hired to protect the patient from an external danger such as disease.
Even informed consent cases involve a kind of rescue. The informed
consent doctrine requires that physicians give information that
helps patients decide on the best course of treatment for a
preexisting condition.33 Legal malpractice cases also involve a
failure to rescue when the lawyer is employed to protect the client
from an external legal hazard such as a lawsuit filed against the
client. Beyond that, the narrow formulation applies by close
analogy to many other types of cases. For example, in failure to
warn cases, the warning often provides protection against an
external risk. 4 Likewise, in cases involving a failure to give a
person a safety device, or even a failure to put a safety device on a
machine, the device often provides protection against an external
risk." Furthermore, if courts began applying loss of a chance to
cases involving warnings and safety devices that failed to protect
against an outside source of danger, they would be very hardpressed to find a principled basis for refusing to apply the doctrine
to cases where the warnings and safety devices failed to protect
against an internal source of danger, e.g., where a safety device on a
product is necessary to protect a user from the product. Even
without such an extension, however, the narrow formulation of loss
of a chance is broad enough to encompass a much wider array of
cases than those currently employing the loss of a chance approach.
A number of writers have articulated a broad formulation of loss
of a chance in cases where traditional damage cannot be proven.
They have pointed out that in any case where defendant creates a
risk of injuring plaintiff, he necessarily deprives plaintiff of a chance
of avoiding injury.37 If, for example, defendant exposes plaintiff to
radiation that creates a 10 percent chance of causing plaintiff to get
33. See 1 DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, §§ 250-51.
34. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976)
(concerning negligent failure to warn murder victim that assailant made
threats on her life); Roberts v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 479 So.2d 426, 430 (La.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding State Department of Transportation owed a duty to the
motoring public to warn of the hazard of cattle on the highways in an
open-range area).
35. E.g., The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932)
(holding that due care required tugboat operator to equip tug with radio
receiver so that the operator could learn of impending storm in time to protect
the barges it was towing by turning back).
36. Jane Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt. 2), 104 LAW Q. REV. 389,
394-95 (1988) [hereinafter Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt. 2)]; see also
Timothy Hill, A Lost Chance for Compensation in the Tort of Negligence by the
House of Lords, 54 MOD. L. REv. 511, 517 (1991); Stephen R. Perry, Protected
Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. OF TORONTO L. J.
247, 255 (1992); David P.T. Price, Causation-TheLords'Lost Chance?, 38 INT'L
& CoMP. L. Q. 735, 735-36 (1989).

37. Hill, supra note 36, at 517; Perry, supra note 36, at 255; Price, supra
note 36, at 735-36; Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt.2), supra note 36, at
394.
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cancer, defendant has deprived plaintiff of a 10 percent chance of
avoiding cancer. Thus, under the broad formulation, loss of a
chance applies to cases where defendant creates the risk as well as
to cases where defendant fails to protect plaintiff from a risk created
by an external source. The British Commonwealth cases exemplify
the broad formulation in that they apply loss of a chance to risk
creating conduct.' They do not, however, apply the doctrine to all
instances of risk creation. In fact, they rather narrowly limit the
doctrine by applying it only in cases involving economic loss, and
only to a limited range of causation issues arising in those cases.Z
Another factor that potentially expands applicability of loss of a
chance is that the doctrine is not restricted to cases where the harm
has already occurred (referred to in this Article as "proportional
damage recovery")."
As the following examples illustrate, the
doctrine can be applied with equal facility to cases where the harm
has yet to occur4 (referred to in this Article as "proportional risk
recovery").4 2 One who exposes another to radiation creating a 10
percent risk of causing cancer deprives that person of a 10 percent
chance of avoiding cancer even if that person has not contracted
cancer at the time of trial.43 A physician that negligently fails to
diagnose a disease, thereby reducing plaintiffs chance of survival,
has reduced that chance of survival even if the patient is still alive
at the time of trial."
The difficulty of limiting application of loss of a chance is
compounded because, in addition to potentially applying to a wide
variety of cases, loss of a chance also potentially applies to a wide
variety of factual determinations relevant to causation in any given
case. A number of determinations may be necessary to establish
causation in any given case, and loss of a chance can often be
38. See infra notes 204-26 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 204-26 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
41. King, Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 27, at 502, 509, 544;
Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt.2), supranote 36, at 394-95; Melissa Moore

Thompson, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting Recouery to
Compensation for Loss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. REv. 453, 453-54 (1994).

Commonwealth cases have applied the loss of a chance approach to cases

involving future economic loss. Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt. 2), supra

note 36, at 394-95. See, e.g., D.W. Moore & Co. v. Ferrier, 1 All E.R. 400 (Eng.
C.A. 1987). The negligent drafting of covenant not to compete gave rise to a tort
cause of action at the time the contract was drafted and not at the time the
partner subject to the covenant left the firm. Id. This is because a properly
drafted covenant had value at the time of contracting. Id. Damages are to be
determined as of the time of contracting by taking into account the chance that
the partner would leave the firm in the future. Id.

42. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
43. Hill, supranote 36, at 517.

44. E.g., Claudet v. Weyrich, 662 So. 2d 131, 132 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (living
plaintiff could recover for reduction of chance of survival from 75 percent to 42
percent); see Mangan, supranote 1, at 309.
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applied to some or all of them. The following example based on the
facts of The T.J. Hooper" illustrates this point.
The Tug
The manufacturer of an ocean going tugboat negligently fails
to equip the tug with a radio receiver so that the operator of
the tug can receive weather reports. The tug is caught in a
storm while towing barges, and the barges sink. The barge
owners sue the manufacturer, claiming that the failure to
supply the radio (the negligence) caused the loss of the barges
(the damage).
In order for the trier of fact to "believe" that the negligence
caused the damage, the trier would have to accept the following
premises as true:
1) the weather service sent a storm warning,
2) the tug operator would have used the radio,
3) the radio would have received the storm warning,
4) the tug operator would have heeded the warning by changing
direction,
5) the change in direction would have occurred soon enough to
avoid the storm, and
6) the storm sank the barges.
A mathematical rule called the conjunction principle suggests
that in order for the trier to believe that the negligence caused the
damage, it would have to believe that most of the six premises were
extremely likely to be true. The conjunction principle states that
the probability of a proposition that depends on a number of
independent constituent factual premises is equal to the
mathematical product of the probability of each premise. 6 Thus, in
the Tug example, assume that each of the six constituent premises
is independent 7 If the trier believed that there was a 90 percent
chance that each premise was true, it would conclude that there was
a 53 percent probability that the negligence caused the damage.
This is because .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 = .53. If there were a 60
percent chance that each premise is true, then the probability that
the negligence caused the damage would be 4.67 percent because .6
x .6 x .6 x .6 x .6 x. 6 = .046656. We know that triers of fact
45. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
46. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353, 1387-90 (1981) (elaborating on the conjunction principle and
citing authorities) [hereinafter King, Causation,Valuation, and Chance].
47. If some of the constituent premises are interdependent, the probability
of the event is determined by a similar but somewhat more complex formula.
For an elaboration on this point, see id. In the Tug example, I use the
simplifying assumption that each premise is independent because exploring the
added complexity of interdependency is unnecessary for purposes of this Article.
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sometimes employ the conjunction principle."3 It is possible, of
course, that they do not always employ it. In the example where the
probability of each premise was 60 percent, a trier not employing
the conjunction principle might conclude that the negligence caused
the damage because it believed that each of the six premises was
true. How often triers of fact use the conjunction principle is beyond
the scope of this Article.
Regardless of whether a trier uses the conjunction principle,
however, it is clear that the trier could not believe that the
negligence caused the damage in the Tug example if it believed that
any one of the six premises was untrue. Yet if plaintiff proved any
five of the premises to a certainty, but was unable to prove the
remaining premise, then plaintiff could characterize the failure to
supply the radio as causing a loss of a chance to prevent the
damage. If plaintiff proved premises one, two, three, four, and six to
a certainty, and proved only a 40 percent chance that premise five
(time to act) was true, plaintiff could claim that the negligence
caused a loss of a 40 percent chance of preventing the damage. Note
that a failure to prove any of the other premises also gives rise to
the same claim. If, for example, there were a 40 percent chance that
the operator would have heeded the warning (premise four), then
the negligence also caused the loss of a 40 percent chance of
preventing the damage.
The illustration can be carried further in two ways by
employing the conjunction principle. First, using the conjunction
principle with the above-illustration would reduce the chance below
40 percent unless the trier was certain that the other five premises
were true. Assume that there was a 90 percent chance that each of
the other five premises was true. A trier using the conjunction
principle would conclude that there was 23.6 percent chance that
the failure to supply the radio caused the damage. This is because
.9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .4 = .236196. Second, with the aid of the
principle, a failure to prove two or more of the six premises would
not defeat the loss of a chance theory. Under the conjunction
principle, the trier would multiply the chances of each unproved
premise to come up with the lost chance. If, for example, one proved
48. See, e.g., Sussman & Anor v. Symes & Ors, No. 1780/90, 1994 N.S.W.

LEXIS 13052 (Austl.). The attorney representing both parties to a transaction
negligently failed to advise the plaintiff, one of the parties, to seek independent
legal advice before agreeing to extinguish a debt owed to him by the other party.
Id. at *2. Plaintiff sued the attorney seeking compensation for the money lost
by extinguishing the debt. Id. at *9. The court awarded 20 percent of the
amount of the extinguished debt as damages on the basis that there was a 25
percent chance that plaintiff would have acted on proper advice by refusing to
extinguish the debt, and there was an 80 percent chance that the other party to
the transaction would have been able to acquire sufficient resources to repay
the debt. Id. at *29-30. The court arrived at the 20 percent figure because .25 x
.80 = .20. Id. at *30.
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only a 40 percent chance that premises two and three were true,
then the lost chance would be 16 percent because .4 x .4 = .16. In
fact, if one could only prove a 40 percent chance that each of the six
premises is true, then the lost chance would be .4 percent because .4
x .4 x .4 x .4 x .4 x .4 = .004096.
Imposing liability on the basis of a .004 chance that the
negligence caused damage-as opposed to a "belief' that the
negligence caused the damage-represents an extraordinary
departure from tradition. This departure is magnified when one
considers that the loss of a chance theory potentially applies to all
tort cases, it applies to ascertaining harm as well as damage, and it
applies to future harm and damage as well as past harm and
damage. This is not to mention that probabilistic proof is not
logically restricted to the causation issues. A court could allow
probabilistic proof of any element of any cause of action including,
for example, the duty and breach issues in a negligence action. Use
of probabilistic proof has the potential to dramatically change the
legal system in ways that most people would probably not approve.
Loss of a chance cannot become a truly viable doctrine unless courts
find limiting principles that restrict its application in an objective
way.
A Note on BrightLine Rules. When courts expand liability, they
often do so in a cautious, experimental way by employing bright line
rules in stages, with early rules creating a narrow scope of expanded
liability and later rules creating a broader scope. These bright line
rules leave some deserving people without compensation because
they fall on the wrong side of the line. Yet, the line is legitimate,
and not arbitrary, if it makes distinctions that, at least in a general
way, further the court's rationale for expanding liability.
This process is illustrated by the evolution of liability for
negligently causing mental distress to a plaintiff who suffered upset
by learning of harm caused to another person. Courts first granted
recovery where plaintiff suffered an impact in the accident, and the
injured person was a close relative.49 Later courts granted recovery
if plaintiff was at risk of an impact (was in the zone of danger), and
the injured person was a close relative." Now most courts follow one
of two rules. Some permit recovery only if plaintiff witnessed an
injury (was close to the scene and observed the accident with her
senses) to a close relative.6' Other more liberal courts now use the
preceding considerations as factors but not elements. 2 They
49. Greenberg v. Stanley, 143 A.2d 588, 590 (N.J. Super. 1958), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 153 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1959) (holding when accident injured
mother and killed daughter, mother was entitled to recovery for mental distress
arising from death of daughter); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at § 54, at
365.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3) (1965).
51. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
52. 2 DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS, supra note 7, § 310, at 841.
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determine whether plaintiff is deserving of recovery based on: 1)
whether he is a close relative, 2) whether he was close to the
accident scene, and 3) whether he observed the accident with his
senses.'
Each of these rules draw principled lines in that the
persons on one side of the line are, in general, more likely to suffer
more serious mental distress than people on the other side of the
line. For example, people generally suffer more distress because of
harm to close relatives than harm to non-relatives. The person
suffering an impact in an accident is more likely to suffer severe
distress than the person who was not touched. The person at risk of
an impact is more likely to suffer distress than the person who
merely witnesses the accident. The witness to the accident is likely
to suffer more serious distress than the person who learns of it later.
The more liberal approach is harder to apply and less predictable
than the others, but it is not arbitrary. A person that meets one or
two of the above-factors is likely to suffer more severe distress than
a person that meets none of them.
On the other hand, a bright line rule that is purely arbitrary, in
that it creates categories that fail to further the court's rationale for
expanded liability, is not defensible.
An example is a rule
permitting recovery for mental distress suffered by plaintiffs who
have a certain hair color or whose names begin with a certain letter
of the alphabet. When courts restrict a doctrine by adopting purely
arbitrary rules, this may indicate one of two things: either the
doctrine is universally valid and should be applied without
restriction, or that the doctrine is invalid and should be discarded.
United States courts apply loss of a chance in medical
malpractice cases, but not in legal malpractice cases. British
Commonwealth courts do exactly the opposite. Is there a principled
basis for these differing approaches? This Article will explore such
questions in its search for limiting principles.
III. RATIONALES FOR Loss OF A CHANCE
A

"ChanceHas Value"
A major rationale for loss of a chance where plaintiff cannot
prove traditional damage is that the chance of obtaining a benefit or
avoiding a harm has value in itself that is entitled to legal
protection.' Thus, destruction of this chance ought to be regarded
53. Id.

54. Murrey v. United States, 73 F.3d 1448, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Wendland
Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462
N.W.2d 44, 57 (Mich. 1990); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 684
v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 1998);

(Mo. 1992); Hugh Evans, Damages for the Loss of a Chance (Damages for
Solicitors'Negligence,part 3), 8 PROF. NEGL. 85, 87-88 (1992); King, Causation,
Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 138; S. M. Waddams, Damages:

Assessment of Uncertainties, 13 J. CONT. L. 55, 60-61 (1998) [hereinafter
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as damage giving rise to an actionable tort.5 Characterizing the
damage as the loss of a chance of avoiding harm (or gaining a
benefit) relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving that the harm
itself (or lost benefit itself) occurred. At the same time, the
characterization preserves the requirement that plaintiff prove
damages by the usual standard of proof. 6 Note, however, that under
the "chance has value" characterization, it is often easier to prove
actionable damage. It is usually easier to prove that defendant
created a risk of harm (or a risk of loss of benefit) than to prove that
defendant caused the harm itself (or benefit itself). 7
The notion that a chance has value is based on the idea that
even a less than 50 percent chance of a cure from a fatal disease,"8 of
winning a lawsuit,59 or of getting land rezoned" is a thing of value
for which a person would be willing to pay. In some cases this value
is reflected in an actual market; a lawsuit with a 50 percent chance
of success has real settlement value,61 and land with a chance of
rezoning will have a higher market value than land without a
chance.62 But6 the
same principle applies even though there is no
3
actual market.
Courts recognizing the theory that chances have value should
logically grant a cause of action for reduction of chance as well as
destruction of chance. That is, if defendant reduces plaintiffs
chance of gaining a benefit from 60 percent to 40 percent, and
plaintiff fails to gain the benefit, defendant should be liable for 20
percent of the lost benefit. There is no theoretical basis for
requiring that defendant completely destroy the chance in order to
be subject to liability.
An intriguing question is whether that action should apply to
cases where defendant reduces but does not destroy plaintiffs
chance of obtaining a benefit, and plaintiff nevertheless obtains the
benefit. Suppose, for example, that plaintiff is seeking a job as an
artist and prepares a special portfolio of sketches for the interview.
Waddams, Assessment of Uncertainties]; Stephen F. Brennwald, Comment,
Proving Causation in "Loss of a Chance" Cases: A ProportionalApproach, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 752-53, 766-74 (1985).

55. Wendland, 574 N.W.2d at 330; Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 48; Wollen,
828 S.W.2d at 684; Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 589 (Nev.
1991); King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1376, 1381;
Brennwald, supranote 54, at 768-72.
56. E.g., Perez, 805 P.2d at 592; Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt. 2),
supra note 36, at 392.
57. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1374; Wex
S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 80 (1956).
58. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 684-85.
59. Waddams, Assessment of Uncertainties,supra note 54, at 60-61.
60. Id.
61. S. M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 13.290 (2d ed. 1991).
62. Waddams, Assessment of Uncertainties,supra note 54, at 60.
63. Brennwald, supra note 54, at 768-73.
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Defendant negligently destroys plaintiffs portfolio shortly before the
job interview. This appears to reduce plaintiffs chance of getting a
job from 60 percent to 40 percent, but plaintiff nevertheless gets the
job. Plaintiff, of course, has an action for destruction of the portfolio.
Should plaintiff, in addition, have an action for loss of the chance to
get the job? The answer is no because, using hindsight, we now
know that the portion of the chance that defendant destroyed had no
real value because plaintiff did not need it to obtain the benefit (the
job).6 The chance lacked value because it was not a true chance at
all. Chance is a concept that arises out of a lack of information. We
think that careless shooting in the vicinity of another person creates
a risk of harming that person. But if we had full information,
including the precise location of the person and the precise direction
of the bullet, we would know that the true chance of harm is either
100 percent or 0 percent. Destroying the portfolio was like shooting
a bullet that missed. We know in hindsight that our estimate of
chance was wrong. Plaintiff was certain to get the job without the
portfolio.
Valuing Damages. Courts have followed three approaches to
valuing damages: proportional compensation, full compensation, and
discretionary valuation.'
We shall see shortly that from an
efficiency perspective the full compensation method is sometimes
preferable to the proportional compensation method, and at other
times it is not.66 As a matter of fairness, however, proportional
compensation is preferable to full compensation.' 7 Under the
proportional method, the fact finder determines the percentage that
the defendant reduced the chance and reduces the value of the thing
lost by that percentage. Awarding as damages the full value of
harm when defendant created only a 20 percent chance of causing
that harm is not fair because we can only conceive of the value of the
chance in probabilistic terms. For this reason, a court choosing to
create a cause of action for loss of a chance should use this measure
regardless of whether the chance exceeds 50 percent.P
The
alternative of giving the plaintiff a reduced recovery (for loss of a
chance) when his proof of causation is below 50 percent and giving
him full recovery (for causation of damage) when his proof of
causation is above 50 percent is inconsistent. It is also unfair
because it requires defendants, as a group, to pay for more harm
than they caused.69
64. Glenn Cooper, Damages for the Loss of a Chance in Contract and Tort, 6
AUCKLAm UNIv. L. REv. 39, 47-48 (1988).
65. Aagaard, supranote 28, at 1348-49 (citing authorities).
66. See infranotes 122-33 and accompanying text.
67. Cooper, supranote 64, at 49.
68. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1387; see
also WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES, supra note 61,

13.310 to 13.320.

69. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1387. For
further discussion of this point, see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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The discretionary valuation method allows the fact finder to
value damages based on its assessment of all the relevant evidence.
The Louisiana Supreme Court describes the process:
Evidence of loss of support, loss of love and affection and other
wrongful death damages is relevant, but not mathematically
determinative, in loss of a chance of survival cases, as is
evidence of the percentage chance of survival at the time of the
malpractice. The plaintiff may also present evidence of, and
argue, other factors to the jury, such as that a ten percent
chance of survival may be more significant when reduced from
ten percent to zero than when reduced from forty to thirty
percent. The jury may also consider such factors as that the
victim, although not likely to survive, would have lived longer
but for the malpractice.70
Social science research confirms the court's intuition that people
place differing values on lost chances depending on where they occur
on the spectrum of probability. 71 This insight, however, largely
misses the point. Damages in wrongful death cases are not awarded
for the loss of life itself.72 They are awarded for the harm flowing
from the death, such as loss of financial support and loss of
consortium. 3 Under the chance has value theory, these losses have
the same value regardless of where they fall on the spectrum of
probability. That is, a 10 percent chance of losing $100,000 in
support is $10,000 regardless of whether the reduction is from 10
percent to 0 percent or from 40 percent to 30 percent. Yet there are
other damages associated with a lost chance that ought to be
awarded in full. These are such things as the extra medical
expenses associated with the delayed diagnosis, and the extra
mental distress caused by the victim's knowledge that she lost her
chance of survival. 74 If a court recognizes these damages, it ought to
award them without reduction. In calculating mental distress
damages, where the loss falls on the spectrum of probability may be
relevant. This is because the value that the victim places on the loss
will affect the amount of mental distress that she suffers. The
discretionary valuation method is too imprecise to make these
distinctions. The most accurate method of valuing damages is to
award proportional compensation for damages, such as lost
70. Smith v. State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 n.10 (La.
1996).
71. Jonathan J. Koehler & Arienne P. Brint, Psychological Aspects of The
Loss of Chance Doctrine, Address Before the American Psychology-Law Society
(Mar. 11, 2000), at http'//www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/3/3509/Papers/Koehler.pdf,
(reporting on an empirical study showing that people placed a higher value on
the loss of a 20 percent chance to survive if the reduction was from 100 percent
to 80 percent than if the reduction was from 60 percent to 40 percent).
72. Aagaard, supra note 28, at 1344.
73. Id. at 1345.
74. Id. at 1352.
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earnings, that should be reduced and to award full recovery for
damages, such as extra medical expenses, that should not be
reduced.
Drawbacks of the Chance Has Value Theory. There are three
drawbacks to basing loss of chance recoveries on the theory that the
lost chance has value in and of itself. One problem, discussed later
in this Article,75 is that the theory would often lead to wildly
speculative damage awards because courts would often have very
little reliable evidence concerning the magnitude of the lost chance.
A second difficulty is that the theory supports a finding that a
plaintiff who has lost a chance has suffered pure economic loss, the
monetary value of the lost chance. Such a showing may not be
sufficient to support a tort action requiring physical harm." Medical
malpractice actions traditionally require a showing that the doctor
caused physical harm to the patient. Wrongful death statutes
typically require that the tortfeasor caused the decedent's death.'
In a case where a doctor negligently deprives a patient of a less than
50 percent chance of avoiding personal injury or death, the evidence
does not show that the negligence caused the personal injury" or
death.79 Courts can, of course, circumvent this problem by creating
a cause of action for purely economic loss in such cases.
For purposes of this Article, there is a third drawback.
Regardless of the merits of the concept that "chance has value," the
concept provides no workable basis for formulating a limiting
principle. This becomes clear by examining the two approaches to
ascertaining when a chance has value.
The first view, espoused by Helen Reece and Stephen R. Perry,
does, in theory, but not in practice, provide a limiting principle.
Reece and Perry object to the idea that the loss of a chance has value
in cases where the harm-producing processes involved are
deterministic. 0 In their view, a chance has value only if it arises
from indeterministic forces. Processes are deterministic when their
past conclusively determines their future, and processes are
indeterministic when there is a random component that makes
future consequences of past events uncertain." With deterministic
processes, the true probability of causation is always either 100
percent or 0 percent. In such cases any estimate of the probability
of causation falling between those two extremes is based on
75. See infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
76. Brian Coote, Chance and the Burden of Proofin Contract and Tort, 62
AUSTRALiAN L.J. 761, 772 (1988).
77. Brennwald, supranote 54, at 786-89.
78. Coote, supra note 76, at 772.

79. United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1099 (Del. 1994); Vollen
v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Mo. 1992).
80. Helen Reece, Losses of Chances in the Law, 59 MOD. L. REv. 188 (1996);
see also Perry, supranote 36.
81. Reece, supranote 80, at 194.
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ignorance of the processes involved, and has no "connection with the
objective world." 2 Such an estimate does not reflect a true chance of
occurrence that can properly be regarded as an asset that has
independent value.'
Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority,8 a case that
Reece and Perry view as deterministic," illustrates the problem.
Plaintiff injured his hip in a fall and was taken to defendant's
hospital for treatment. Defendant negligently failed to diagnose and
treat the injury. Plaintiff later developed a seriously disabling
condition, avascular necrosis, because of an inadequate blood supply
to the affected area. The inadequate blood supply could have been
caused either by the rupture of a sufficient number of blood vessels
at the time of the fall or by subsequent excessive pressure in the
joint due to inadequate treatment at the time of plaintiffs initial
visit to the hospital. Based on expert testimony, the trial court
found that there was a 75 percent risk that sufficient blood vessels
were ruptured in the initial fall to make the avascular necrosis
unavoidable. The trial judge awarded plaintiff 25 percent of his
damages on the theory that defendant's negligence deprived plaintiff
of a 25 percent chance of avoiding the avascular necrosis. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but the House of Lords reversed,
reasoning that the condition of plaintiffs blood vessels at the time of
initial treatment was a past event which plaintiff must prove by a
balance of probabilities. Because he was unable to prove this,
however, he was entitled to no damages for the disability caused by
the avascular necrosis.
The processes in Hotson were deterministic because at the time
of his initial treatment, plaintiff either had sufficient blood vessels
to avoid avascular necrosis or he did not. In the former case he
would have had a 100 percent chance of avoiding the disabling
injury, and the defendant's negligence interfered with his interest in
avoiding the injury. In the latter case he had a 0 percent chance of
avoiding the injury, and defendant's negligence did not interfere
with that interest. The finding that he lost a 25 percent chance of
avoiding the injury is simply an estimate based on ignorance of the
existing facts. As Professor Perry states, "[tihe reduction of the 25
per cent chance to 0 per cent was not an occurrence that took place
in the physical world."86
According to Reece and Perry, if a causal process is truly
indeterministic, because it contains a random component, then the
chance of causing a harm or a benefit is "a property of the external
world, similar to mass or volume, independent of human knowledge
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 193.
Perry, supra note 36, at 260.
2 All E.R. 909 (Eng. H.L. 1987).
Perry, supra note 36, at 258, 261; Reece, supra note 80, at 195.
Perry, supra note 36, at 259.
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or belief" 7' that can be valued.' An example is a lottery ticket that
is not placed in the draw due to defendant's negligence.' Here it is
impossible to know whether plaintiff would have won the lottery if
the ticket had been placed in the draw. Plaintiff lost a true chance
of winning that can only be understood in probabilistic terms. It is
rational to regard that chance as having a distinct value, and to
grant a cause of action for loss of that thing of value.
Unfortunately, the distinction between deterministic and
indeterministic forces does not provide the basis for a useful limiting
principle. This is because "it is difficult, if not impossible, to know
that an event is indeterministic.""'
Consider the Medical
Misdiagnosis example discussed previously." It is possible that the
processes involved in stage two breast cancer are deterministic, so
that if we knew enough about the disease and about the individual
characteristics of each patient, we could identify in advance the 40
percent of patients that could be effectively treated and the 60
percent that could not be. On the other hand, it is possible that the
processes are indeterministic so that no matter how much
information we had, we could not predict which patients fall in
which group. Science does not answer this question.
Because science cannot help us distinguish between
deterministic and indeterministic forces, we can apply that
distinction as a limiting principle only by relying on our intuition
about what forces are indeterministic. Our intuition, however, is
almost certain to lead us astray. One thing that science can tell us
is that our instinct of how the universe works is wildly inaccurate.
If we balanced a playing card on edge, we would expect it to fall to
either the right or to the left. One respected theory of quantum
mechanics predicts that the card falls to both the right and the left. "
Each fall takes place in a parallel world whose occupants are
unaware of the other world.93 Likewise, the destroyed lottery ticket
would have won in one world and lost in another. Surely, intuition
can be no better than science at identifying indeterministic forces.
A second view of the "chance has value" theory, espoused by
Nils Jansen, takes a more practical approach.' He disputes the
distinction between deterministic and indeterministic forces.' He
argues that as a practical matter people value all apparent chances
87.
88.
89.
90.

Reece, supranote 80, at 193.
Perry, supranote 36, at 260.
Id.; Reece, supranote 80, at 195.
Reece, supranote 80, at 194.

91. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
92. Max Tegmark & John Archibald Wheeler, 100 Years of Quantum
Mysteries, Sc. A., Feb. 2001, at 68, 72.
93. Id.
94. Nils Jansen, The Idea of a Lost Chance, 19 OxFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 271
(1999).

95. Id. at 277-79.
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to avoid harm regardless of whether the forces are deterministic or
indeterministic.9 6 Because people value a chance, its destruction is a
thing of value that merits compensation." Jansen is correct that
people do value such chances. It is entirely rational to value an
illusory chance (one that is predetermined not to exist) as highly as
an actual chance (one based on indeterministic forces) as long as one
is ignorant that the chance in question is an illusion.
Unfortunately, Jansen's view also fails to provide a limiting
principle. If all lost chances have value, and if all questionable
causation issues can be viewed as involving a lost chance, then the
"chance has value" theory of damages can be applied in virtually
every case of questionable causation.
B.

Autonomy
Professor Perry offers a rationale for imposing liability in loss of
a chance cases that avoids the necessity of distinguishing between
deterministic and indeterministic causal processes." He argues that
interfering with plaintiffs personal autonomy justifies imposing
liability for loss of a chance." Such interference occurs when a
defendant knowingly causes plaintiff to rely to his detriment on an
undertaking or misrepresentation.' 0
Depriving plaintiff of the
opportunity to follow a preferable course of action should be treated
as a tort loss. 0 ' Thus, Professor Perry sees the gravamen of the tort
as the lost opportunity to follow a preferable course of action rather
than the lost chance of avoiding a harm or gaining a benefit.' ' He
would, however, take the lost chance into account in valuing
damages.1 3 Therefore, he would permit the plaintiff in Hotson to
recover because the defendant deprived plaintiff of the opportunity
of seeking appropriate medical treatment. This is a preferable
course of action because at the time of the treatment there were
reasonable grounds for believing that appropriate treatment might
have helped.' M
96. Id. at 279-84.
97. Id.
98. Perry, supra note 36, at 289.

99. Id.

Professor Waddams makes a very similar argument.

S.M.

Waddams, The Valuation of Chances, 70 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 86, 90, 94 (1998)
[hereinafter Waddams, The Valuation of Chances] (asserting that the wrong is
withholding treatment or information, and damages should be measured
according to the probability that the plaintiff would have benefited from the
treatment or information); see also King, Reduction of Likelihood, supra note
27, at 533 ("[A] preferable way of [viewing plaintiffs injury in Hotson] is to
view it as the loss of the opportunity to allow events to play out in order to see if
the plaintiff's condition was in fact amenable to restoration.").
100. Perry, supranote 36, at 270, 276.
101. Id. at 290-91.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 291, 309-11.
104. Id. at 291, 309.

HeinOnline -- 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 624 2001

2001]

LOSS OF A CHANCE

625

This autonomy theory has broad application. In addition to
applying to negligent misrepresentation cases and medical
negligence cases like Hotson, the theory also applies to medical
malpractice informed consent cases' G and legal malpractice cases
involving improper advice.' 6 The theory can also easily be extended
to product liability failure to warn cases. 7
The crucial aspects of Professor Perry's theory are that he
requires detrimental reliance, and he defines detriment to include
the loss of a chance to follow a course of action that reasonably
appears to reduce the risk of economic loss or physical injury."3
Note that if he defined detriment narrowly to include only actual
physical harm or economic loss, the autonomy theory would be
largely superfluous. The law already provides several actions
permitting recovery for harm intentionally or negligently caused by
reliance on an undertaking. The negligence cause of action applies
to physical harm, and the misrepresentation cause of action applies
to economic harm. Professor Perry's theory accommodates recovery
for loss of a chance only because he defines detriment to include
increased risk of harm.
Professor Perry's theory can provide a principled basis for
limiting the loss of a chance doctrine. But whether it does depends
on courts adopting the theory because they are genuinely interested
in protecting autonomy. If courts adopt the theory primarily
because they desire to grant recovery for loss of a chance, rather
than to protect autonomy, then the theory would be a mere
subterfuge rather than a useful limiting principle. The question of
why to depart from the usual standard of proof would remain
unanswered.
Professor Perry's version of the autonomy theory presents a risk
of subterfuge because his definition of detriment is sufficiently
restrictive to limit the autonomy theory to loss of a chance cases.
Many interferences with autonomy cause detriment other than the
loss of a chance to avoid harm. A manufacturer's false claim that its
product is "Made in America" interferes with the autonomy of
customers who are influenced to buy the product because of the
claim. And this is true even if the product is a good value. A
business that falsely claims to be an "Equal Opportunity Employer"
interferes with the autonomy of all the people it deals with who
would not knowingly contract with such a business. The detriment
in both examples is that the customers were falsely induced to alter
their conduct. In addition, if the customers have strongly-held
views, they are likely to suffer psychological detriment (mental
105. Id. at 311.
106. Id. at 293.
107. Denis W. Boivin, FactualCausationin the Law of ManufacturerFailure
to Warn, 30 OTrAWAL. REv. 47,85-86 (1998).
108. See Perry, supra note 36, at 290-91.
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distress) upon learning the truth. Likewise, a politician that obtains
a vote by making a false campaign promise interferes with the
voter's autonomy. Why would a court that is genuinely concerned
with protecting autonomy not grant a meaningful cause of action in
all cases where there is any detriment? Why not treat interferences
with autonomy as a dignitary tort like assault or battery, and grant
recovery even though there is no detriment or harm at all?
Yet, it is quite possible for a court to adopt Professor Perry's
theory because its primary purpose is to protect autonomy. As
pointed out previously, 9 courts usually expand liability cautiously.
If courts desire to increase protection for autonomy, Professor
Perry's proposal is a logical first step. Even though its application is
broad, we shall see that Perry's theory does have some value as a
limiting principle.
C.

FairnessBased on Difficulty of Proof
Several writers assert fairness as a primary justification for the
recovery for the loss of a chance, based on either the injustice of
denying all recovery to people who fall slightly short of proving their
cases by a preponderance of evidence," the injustice of granting no
relief against a defendant who has carelessly destroyed a less than
50 percent chance of a successful outcome,"' or the injustice of
denying recovery because of a lack of evidence where the defendant
has negligently increased the risk of harm."'
All of these
justifications for loss of a chance have appeal, but they have little
value as limiting principles because they point toward imposing
proportional recovery in practically every case where plaintiff is
unable to prove that the wrongdoer caused his harm.
Professor King makes a more specific fairness argument. He
contends that loss of a chance recovery is justified where the
defendant's tortious conduct creates the lack of evidence that
prevents plaintiff from proving damages by a preponderance of
evidence."'
For example, where a doctor negligently fails to
diagnose and treat plaintiffs disease, defendant deprives plaintiff1 of
14
ever knowing whether the treatment would have been successful.
This rationale has merit, and courts sometimes rely on it as a reason
for using loss of a chance in medical misdiagnosis cases."'
109. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
110. Walter Scott, Causationin Medico-Legal Practice:A Doctor'sApproach
to the "LostOpportunity' Cases, 55 MOD. L. REv. 521, 524-25 (1992).
111. Evans, supra note 54, at 87; Marc Stauch, Causation,Risk, and Loss of
Chance in Medical Negligence, 17 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 205, 219-20 (1997).
112. Price, supra note 36, at 751, 758-60.
113. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1378; King,
Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 27, at 529-35; see also Waddams,
Assessment of Uncertainties,supra note 54, at 66.
114. King, Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 27, at 534-35.
115. E.g., McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 469 (Okla.
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The problem with King's rationale, for our purposes, is that it
provides very little basis for limiting the loss of a chance doctrine.
Tortfeasor conduct commonly impairs plaintiffs' ability to prove
causation. Assume, for example, that a tortfeasor negligently
exposes plaintiff to a carcinogen that increases plaintiffs chances of
getting cancer by 10 percent, and plaintiff later contracts cancer.
The tortfeasor has prevented the plaintiff from ever knowing
whether she would have gotten cancer anyway from other
carcinogens.
Employing loss of a chance in all cases where
defendant's conduct impairs plaintiffs ability to prove causation
would take us a very long way toward the general use of
probabilistic causation.
D.

Deterrence
A number of scholars justify the loss of a chance approach on
deterrence grounds." 6 They argue that efficient deterrence is
achieved by granting recovery for loss of a chance and measuring
damages by discounting plaintiffs actual or potential harm by the
probability that defendant caused the harm. They criticize the all or
nothing rule as being harsh and imprecise 7 Under that rule a
tortfeasor who created a 51 percent risk of causing plaintiffs harm
will pay 100 percent of plaintiffs damages (resulting in
overdeterrence); but the tortfeasor would pay nothing if she created
a 49 percent risk of causing plaintiffs harm (resulting in
underdeterrence)."' The loss of a chance approach is more precise
because the tortfeasor would pay 51 percent of plaintiffs damages in
the former case and 49 percent of plaintiffs damages in the latter
case." How meritorious this argument is depends on the likelihood
that a suit will be brought for wrongful infliction of harm and on
whether the suit is for past harm or future harm.
Likelihood of Suit. According to economic theory, actors will use
appropriate precautions if they know they will be held liable for all
the harm they cause in the event they use inadequate precautions. 0
Holding wrongdoers liable for less harm than they cause will induce
them to take too few precautions, and holding them liable for more
harm than they cause may possibly induce them to take too many
precautions."2 ' In the Medical Misdiagnosis example discussed

1987); see also Ellis, supra note 27, at 378-79 (citing and discussing cases).
116. See Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence (pt. 2), supra note 36, at 399 &
n.24 (citing and summarizing authorities).
117. Id. at 399 (citing authorities).
118. Id. (citing authorities).
119. Id. (citing authorities).
120. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REv. 869, 883-85 (1998).
121. For a detailed explanation of why this is true, and for a discussion of
the effect of the amount of damages on activity levels, see id.
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previously, 112 some courts would use a relaxed approach to causation
that would apparently hold the physician liable for all the plaintiffs
harm even though the physician only increased the risk of death by
40 percent.123 Assume the disease caused harm of $1,000,000. This
relaxed causation approach appears to risk overdeterrence because
it leads to the actor paying for more harm than she expected to
cause. The tortfeasor's expected damages are $400,000 because she
created a 40 percent chance of causing a $1,000,000 loss (.40 x
1,000,000 = 400,000). ' 24 If she is liable for $1,000,000, she pays
$600,000 in "punitive" (or extra) damages. An arguably preferable
approach is to apply a probabilistic rule and hold the physician
liable for $400,000 because appropriate deterrence is achieved if the
physician faces expected liability that is equal to the losses she
expects to cause. 12' A third approach is to use the all or nothing
rule. Whether the probabilistic
12 6 rule is preferable to the all or
nothing rule is discussed below.
There is a second approach to loss of a chance that also risks
overdeterrence. Some writers advocate granting a proportional
recovery in cases where the risk of harm is 50 percent or less and
granting full recovery where the risk of harm is more than 50
percent.12' This risks overdeterrence because it places actors at risk
of paying for more harm than they cause."' Defendants as a class
will pay punitive (or extra) damages if they systematically pay 100
percent of damages in all cases where plaintiff can prove causation
by a preponderance of evidence (greater than 50 percent) and partial
damages in cases where plaintiff cannot prove causation (50 percent
or less). To illustrate, assume that in one case X creates a 2/3 risk of
causing $99 in damages and in another case X creates a 1/3 risk of
causing $99 in damages. If X is held liable for $99 in the first case
and $33 in the second case, she will have paid $132 in total damages
even though she actually caused damages of only $99.
Punitive damages create a risk of overdeterrence, however, only
if they result in excessive liability. Negligent tortfeasors may not
always pay for all the harm they cause. They can escape liability for
a variety of reasons such as the difficulty of proving an element of
plaintiffs case or because plaintiffs damages are too small to
finance the cost of a lawsuit.129 A repeat tortfeasor that pays full
122. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
124. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONozmc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 12 (4th ed.
1992).
125. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW § 5.3.2, at 116
(1987).

126. See infra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
127. Truckor, supra note 27, at 372.
128. Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring
Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 691, 707, 718 (1990).
129. Polinsky & Shavell, supranote 120, at 888.
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damages in some cases and escapes liability in other cases will be
underdeterred. Likewise, one-time-tortfeasors that have a good
chance of escaping liability are underdeterred because their
expected liability is reduced. Expected liability is the amount the
tortfeasor expects to pay if she is held liable multiplied by the
chance that she will escape liability. In the Medical Misdiagnosis
example, the physician's expected liability is $250,000 if she believes
that there is a 25 percent chance that she will be liable for the
$1,000,000 (expected damage of $400,000 plus punitive damage of
$600,000).13 Her expected liability is only $100,000 if she believes
that there is a 25 percent chance that she will be liable for $400,000
(expected damages only).
Neither result risks overdeterrence
because in both cases her expected liability is still less than her
expected damage of $400,000. This illustrates the problem of
underdeterrence. Awarding punitive damages (the extra $600,000)
helps correct the underdeterrence problem in the example by
partially restoring proper incentives."'
130. Id. at 889 n.46.

131. Polinsky and Shavell elaborate on the nature of the problem and
explain the appropriate solution in the following passage:
[Injurers will sometimes be able to escape liability for harms for
which they should be held responsible. The consequences of this
possibility are clear: if damages merely equal harm, injurers'
incentives to take precautions will be inadequate and their incentive
to participate in risky activities will be excessive. Suppose that there
is only a one-in-four chance that an injurer will be found liable for a
$100,000 harm, for which he would have to pay damages of $100,000.
On average, then, the injurer will pay $25,000 when he causes the
harm-only a fraction of the harm caused. If the harm could have
been prevented each time by taking a $50,000 precaution, the injurer
will not have an adequate incentive to take the precaution, because
the precaution cost will exceed his average liability cost by a
substantial margin. Moreover, because the injurer will pay only
$25,000 on average for a $100,000 harm, he will engage in the risky
activity to an excessive degree. If the injurer is a firm, the price of its
product will rise by an amount reflecting only one-quarter of the harm
caused, leading consumers of the product to buy more of it, and
thereby cause more harm, than is socially desirable.
To remedy these problems of underdeterrence, damages that are
imposed in those instances in which injurers are found liable should
be raised sufficiently so that injurers' average damages will equal the
harm they cause. In the example in the preceding paragraph, in
which the chance of being found liable for having caused a $100,000
harm is only one in four, damages should be raised to $400,000. Then,
on average, the injurer will pay $100,000 when he causes the harmon average, every four times he causes harm, he will be found liable
once for $400,000. Equivalently, his total damages will tend to equal
the total amount of harm that he has caused. As we emphasized
above, making injurers liable for the harm they cause will induce
them to take proper precautions and participate appropriately in risky
activities.
Polinsky & Shavell, supranote 120, at 888-89 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
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When tortfeasors often escape liability, using an approach such
as relaxed causation, to impose excessive liability will not create
overdeterrence unless the tortfeasor's expected liability exceeds her
expected harm. Studies of medical negligence in the United States
show that only one claim is filed for every five to ten negligently
inflicted injuries, 3 2 and only about 19 percent of the most seriously
injured malpractice victims receive compensation. 33 If the studies
accurately reflect the degree to which physicians escape liability for
negligence in the United States, then any extra compensation
awarded in the small number of cases where they are held liable
may usefully strengthen physicians' incentives to use due care.
This, however, is not the whole story. Courts may sometimes
erroneously hold physicians liable when they are not negligent. The
prospect of such negligence may cause physicians to raise their level
of care in order to avoid such liability. Therefore, in order to
determine whether physicians as a whole are held liable for too little
harm, the cases where non-negligent physicians are erroneously
held liable must be counterbalanced against the cases where
negligent physicians escape liability. Whether the relaxed causation
approach promotes proper deterrence in medical malpractice cases
is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Article. It is
a question well worth exploring, however, because the data showing
the very low frequency of recovery for medical negligence suggests
that physicians may be underdeterred if their liability is restricted
to the harm that they caused.
Present Harm and Future Harm. Putting aside the question of
whether tortfeasors are held liable frequently enough, another
deterrence consideration raised by loss of a chance is whether the
claim is for past harm or future harm. Loss of a chance cases fall
into two categories: "proportional damage recovery" and
"proportional risk recovery."1 34 "Proportional damage recovery"
cases are those that permit a plaintiff to recover a portion of his
damages only after he has suffered the injury or acquired the
disease. 135 If a defendant doctor reduced a patient's chance of
surviving cancer by 20 percent, and the patient died from the
cancer, plaintiff would recover 20 percent of harm caused by the
death. If the doctor reduced a patient's chance of surviving cancer
by 60 percent, and the patient died, the plaintiff would recover 60
percent of the damages caused by the death.
"Proportional risk recovery" cases permit a plaintiff to recover a
132. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern MalpracticeLaw,
87 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (on file with the author) (reviewing the
literature).
133. Russell A. Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims And
Adverse Events Due To Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study III, NEW ENG. J. MED., July 25, 1991, at 245-51.
134. Fischer, supra note 3, at 1202.
135. Id.

HeinOnline -- 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 630 2001

2001]

LOSS OFA CHANCE

portion of her future harm before she has been injured or made ill.'
If a defendant doctor reduced a patient's chance of surviving cancer
by 20 percent, plaintiff could sue before the cancer recurs. The
measure of damages would be 20 percent of harm that would occur if
the cancer does recur. Note that in such cases the cancer may never
recur. The patient, for example, may have initially had a 40 percent
chance of survival that the doctor negligently reduced to a 20
percent chance. The patient may nevertheless survive because her
chance of survival was not completely destroyed.
In an
Present Harm-Proportional Damage Recovery.
that
demonstrated
Kaye
David
important article, Professor
probabilistic causation does not necessarily lead to more satisfactory
results in proportional damage recovery cases." The probabilistic
rule actually generates more errors affecting deterrence than the
preponderance rule because the probabilistic rule makes mistakes in
every case, either an overpayment by a defendant because the
claimant recovered damages even though he was not injured by the
defendant, or an underpayment by a defendant because the
claimant was injured by the defendant and received less than all of
his damages."8 In comparison, the all or nothing rule is correct in
most cases, but makes a small number of fairly large errors.3 The
all or nothing rule is "unbiased" in that it fairly allocates the
mistakes between plaintiffs and defendants "[als long as the
probabilities [of causation] are distributed across cases and parties
This is the usual case because most
in a symmetric way."4
activities involve groups of plaintiffs and defendants where the
probability of causation varies from case to case, sometimes more
than 50 percent and sometimes less.' In such cases "discrepancies
in the error rates tend to average out, and the enterprise as a whole
136. Id.
137. David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard:
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation,
1982 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487.

138. Id. at 496, 500-02. This approach to measuring error is "deterrence
oriented" because it focuses on erroneous payments made by defendants.
Levmore, supra note 128, at 699. While error minimization is not an ultimate
goal of the tort system, it is thought to be a "proxy for a more useful social goal
such as the minimization of undesirable consequences like injuries." Id. at 696

n.8.
139. Kaye, supra note 137, at 502; accord Levmore, supra note 128, at 695.
Professors Orloff and Stedinger argue that the probabilistic rule might still be
superior to the all or nothing rule. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework
for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-EvidenceStandard,131 U. PA. L. REv.
1159, 1163-72 (1983). The probabilistic rule produces a large number of small
errors that are evenly distributed among the parties. Id This is often likely to
be less socially disruptive than the all or nothing rule, which produces a small

number of large errors that may fall unequally on plaintiffs or on defendants,
depending on the type of case. Id.
140. Kaye, supra note 137, at 502.
141 Id.
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is charged the appropriate gross amount for the injuries it causes. " 1
The all or nothing rule, however, does produce "biased" results
in cases where "a single defendant faces the possibility of numerous
suits from similarly situated plaintiffs and the probability that this
defendant is liable is the same in each of these cases."14 Here
defendants are underdeterred if the likelihood of causation is less
than 50 percent (they are never held liable for anything) and they
are overdeterred if the likelihood of causation is over 50 percent but
less than 100 percent (they are always held liable for 100 percent).
Professor Levmore has denominated such cases as "recurring
misses." 4 In recurring miss cases the probabilistic rule produces
superior results because it holds all defendants liable in accordance
with the probability of causation so that in the end each defendant
will be liable for the amount of harm that it actually caused.14 The
probabilistic rule achieves appropriate deterrence in recurring miss
cases only when it is applied to all such cases, even those where
causation can be established by a preponderance of evidence.' 46
Identifying cases that are recurring misses is a matter of some
difficulty. According to Levmore, examples of recurring misses
include medical malpractice cases involving cost-justified procedures
that have a low chance of success, and failure to warn and informed
consent cases where only a small fraction of the recipients of the
information would have altered their behavior. 4
Medical
malpractice cases are probably the most promising category of cases
for distinguishing recurring miss cases from standard cases because
scientists have collected good statistical information concerning the
chances of success of a wide variety of medical procedures.'
Most
malpractice cases would not qualify as recurring misses, however,
because most physicians diagnose and treat a variety of patients
with a variety of ailments, giving rise to widely varying chances of a
cure. Such physicians are adequately deterred by the all or nothing
rule. The "recurring miss" theory would apply only in relatively rare
cases where a given physician encounters numerous cases where the
chances of a cure are all approximately the same. Identifying
recurring misses is much more difficult in other kinds of cases. In
cases involving such issues as failure to warn, legal malpractice, and
loss of business opportunity it is hard to identify recurring misses
because the facts of each case are highly individualistic and there is
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Levmore, supranote 128, at 705. While Professor Levmore is primarily
concerned with cases where the probability of causation is consistently less than
50 percent, he also applies his "recurring miss" terminology to cases where the
probability of causation is consistently greater than 50 percent. Id. at 707.
145. Kaye, supra note 137, at 502; Levmore, supra note 128, at 705-07.
146. Levmore, supranote 128, at 718.
147. Id. at 706.
148. Id. at 719.
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no good body of statistics showing the likelihood of causation.
Future Harm-ProportionalRisk Recovery. Professor Kaye's
criticism of the proportional damage recovery theory, that it makes
a mistake in every case, does not apply to cases seeking proportional
risk recovery for losses that can be insured against. This latter
theory awards a reduced recovery to any person exposed to a risk of
future harm that has not yet come to pass. Not all of these persons
will actually suffer harm, but each has suffered a loss in an
actuarial sense because his chances of avoiding the harm have been
reduced.'
These kinds of losses can often be insured against, and
plaintiffs that use their recoveries to purchase such insurance are
not overcompensated. 5 ' Those plaintiffs that actually suffer the
future loss will receive appropriate compensation from their
insurance companies. Those plaintiffs that do not suffer the future
loss receive nothing from their insurance companies, and thus, are
not overcompensated.
Some United States medical malpractice cases use loss of a
chance to grant proportional risk recovery; they compensate the
patient for the harm risked by the physician's negligence even
though the harm has not yet occurred."' In Claudet v. Weyrich " a
physician negligently failed to diagnose plaintiffs breast cancer
when it was in Stage I. Instead, he diagnosed it after it had
progressed to Stage II. If the cancer had been treated in Stage I,
plaintiff would have had a 75 percent chance of survival with proper
treatment. Because it was diagnosed in Stage II, plaintiffs chance
of survival was reduced to 42 percent. The court upheld a jury
award that included a recovery of 33 percent of damages that would
result if she died in the future because of a recurrence of the cancer.
The damages included future lost wages, insurance premiums, and
physical and mental suffering. Permitting proportional recovery in
149. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995). The
failure to diagnose testicular cancer caused it to spread, necessitating
additional surgery and chemotherapy;, it also caused a 15 percent chance of

recurrence of testicular cancer. Id at 74-75. The chance of recurrence would
have been 0 percent if diagnosis had been prompt. Id. at 75. The court held
that because defendant caused physical harm, plaintiff can recover for the
increased risk of future cancer as an element of damages. Id. at 74. The court
rejected the all or nothing rule because plaintiffs life expectancy had been
shortened by this risk. Id. at 77.
150. Fischer, supra note 3, at 1224-25.
151. Claudet v. Weyrich, 662 So. 2d 131 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (living plaintiff
could recover for reduction of chance of survival from 75 percent to 42 percent).
Contra Andersen v. Brigham Young Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1124, 1128, 1130 (D.
Utah 1995) (plaintiff alleged an increased risk of future disease, but no present
symptoms and no present harm caused by delay in treatment; the court
dismissed the case, predicting that Utah would not recognize loss of a chance in
the absence of actual harm). Such recovery is most common in cases where the
defendant has caused a distinct harm that carries with it an increased risk of a
future illness or injury. See infra notes 157-92 and accompanying tet.
152. 662 So. 2d 131 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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such cases can be justified on deterrence grounds.
Note that the argument that reduced recovery is justifiable in
proportional risk recovery cases does not depend on the "chance has
value" theory discussed above.'5 3 The actuarial loss that the plaintiff
suffers in proportional risk recovery cases creates the necessity of
buying insurance against future losses simply because the future is
unknown. Any future loss that materializes poses a hardship if it
has not been insured against. That hardship exists without regard
to such questions as whether before the event people would have
valued the chance of avoiding the loss or whether the forces at work
are deterministic or indeterministic.
Value of Deterrence as a Limiting Principle. This analysis

shows that efficient deterrence is enhanced by the use of loss of a
chance for torts where claims are often not pursued and also for
torts involving either recurring misses or proportional risk recovery.
These insights are useful as limiting principles, however, only to the
extent that deterrence is an important objective of tort law. United
States scholars are divided over the question of whether the tort
system is primarily concerned with achieving efficiency (appropriate
deterrence)' or with achieving corrective justice."
The British

153. See supra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
154. Richard Posner first explained the tort system 'in... terms of economic
analysis," contending that efficient allocation of resources requires appropriate
deterrence of accidents. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1806
(1997); see also Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property
Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201, 209 (1971); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 32-33 (1972). Many other scholars have joined
Posner in engaging in economic analysis of tort cases. See, e.g., STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Guido Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CH. L. REv. 69 (1975); Levmore, supranote 128.
155. Aristotle first advanced the "notion of corrective justice." Catharine
Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice:A PragmaticJustificationfor Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2350 (1990). The objective is to nullify
gains and losses that arise between persons when one person wrongfully injures
the other. Id. at 2350, 2355. Many scholars in recent years have emphasized
corrective justice as a rationale for tort law. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992). Corrective justice scholars
advocate widely divergent definitions of corrective justice. See Jules L.
Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), 1 LAW &
PHIL. 371 (1982), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983) (developing "foundational" principles
to be used to devise specific rules for resolving cases); Richard A. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973) (contending that
causation of harm is the basis for corrective justice); George P. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-56 (1972)
(claiming that reciprocity of risk is the basis for corrective justice); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 43
(1983) (using Kantian principles); Wells, supra at 2353 (advocating adoption of
procedures that encourage juries to do justice in individual cases).
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Commonwealth view places primary emphasis on corrective justice,
regarding deterrence as a secondary consideration." ' To the extent
that deterrence is a secondary consideration, it may not be powerful
enough by itself to warrant adoption of a controversial doctrine like
loss of a chance.
IV. Loss OF A CHANCE WHERE TRADITIONAL DAMAGE IS PROVEN
Courts use loss of a chance most often to value harm in cases
where plaintiff has proven the elements of the tort by a
preponderance of evidence. An example is where plaintiff proves
that defendant negligently caused actionable damage by brealdng
plaintiffs knee, but the extent of the harm is uncertain because
there is a risk that plaintiff will develop arthritis in the knee in the
future. Usually plaintiffs can bring only one cause of action for each
tort, and they must recover all of their damages (including damages
for future harm) in that action."' It is often impossible to prove
some harm, such as future harm, by a preponderance of evidence.
To meet these proof problems, the English,' 3 Canadian," and
Australian160 courts apply the loss of a chance doctrine where
damage is proven but the amount of the loss depends on future
events (the plaintiffs future position) or hypothetical events (the
position the plaintiff would have been in had no tort occurred). The
rule is that where there is insufficient evidence to prove these
events on the balance of probabilities, they award damages in
proportion to the chance of the loss as long as the chance is not
unduly speculative. 1 ' If the consequential loss can be proven on the
balance of probabilities, plaintiff receives full damages."- Proof on
the balance of probabilities is always required for losses based on
past facts."
Therefore, whether an existing arthritic condition
156. PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND EcoNomic INTERESTS 406-07 (1991) ("[Tihe

prime function of the English law of tort is the correction of past wrongs; the
deterrence of future wrongful conduct is a secondary, although not
unimportant, aim.").
157. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDiES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 406

(2d ed. Prac. Series 1993) [hereinafter DOBBS, LAW OFREMEDIES).
158. Mallett v. McMonagle, 2 All E.R. 178 (Eng. ILL. 1969). See generally
ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF CoNTrRACT 31 12d ed.
1994).

159. Athey v. Leonati [1966] 140 D.L.R. 4th 235 (Can.); see Waddams, The
Valuation of Chances, supranote 99, at 87.
160. Malec v. J.C. Hutton Pty. Ltd. (1990) 92 A.L.R. 545 (Austl.); see
Mitchell McInnes, Causationin Tort Law: Back to Basics at the Supreme Court
of Canada, 35 ALBERTA L. REv. 1013, 1032 (1997); Waddams, The Valuation of
Chances,supra note 99, at 87.
161. BURROWS, supra note 158, at 31; Waddams, The Valuation of Chances,
supranote 99, at 87.
162. BURROWS, supra note 158, at 33.
163. Id. at 31; WADDAMs, THE LAW OF DAMAGES, supra note 61, at Sl13.140;
Waddams, Assessment of Uncertainties,supra note 54, at 61.
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resulted from a broken knee is a question of past fact that must be
proven by a preponderance of evidence." If plaintiff proves this, she
receives full compensation for the arthritis, and if she does not prove
it, she receives no compensation for the arthritis. But whether
arthritis will develop in the future from a broken knee is a future
event that is compensable in accordance with the probability that
the event will occur.
The Commonwealth distinction between past facts and
hypothetical facts when valuing loss is not based on the difference
between deterministic and indeterministic facts. Rather, it is based
on the idea that past events are provable, but future events and
hypothetical events are inherently unknowable and, thus, subject to
a lesser standard of proof. Several Commonwealth scholars criticize
the distinction between past facts and hypothetical events as
illusory."
Under the "but for" test of causation, past facts are
established only by proving what would have happened in a
different state of the world.'66 Therefore, all causal questions are
hypothetical." 7 While it is true that all causation questions are
hypothetical under the but for test, there still is some merit to the
Commonwealth distinction. Knowing what happened can often help
us resolve the hypothetical question. If a broken knee causes
arthritis 15 percent of the time, there is an 85 percent chance that
plaintiffs knee trauma will not lead to arthritis. This 85 percent
includes the chance that plaintiff will never get arthritis in the
knee. But if plaintiff does develop arthritis, the chance that plaintiff
will not get arthritis is eliminated, and this necessarily increases
the likelihood that trauma caused the arthritis above 15 percent.
Plaintiff can further increase this likelihood by eliminating or
reducing the possibility that other causal factors (such as heredity)
were operating. If plaintiff sufficiently eliminates other causal
factors, the trier will be able to conclude rationally that the knee
trauma did cause plaintiffs arthritis. 68 In this case it is easier to
prove the past fact than the future event. This is probably true
often enough that the Commonwealth distinction is not arbitrary.
164. See B.C. Elec. R. Co. v. Clarke [1950] 3 D.L.R. 161 (Can.) (addressing
whether "Dupuytren's contracture" resulted from trauma to plaintiffs hand to
be determined by the balance of the probabilities).
165. MICHAEL A. JONES, TEXTBOOK ON TORTS 217 (6th ed. 1998); Price, supra
note 36, at 753; Reece, supra note 80, at 191-92; Ben Smith, Loss of a Chance,
29 VIcT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 225, 237-38 (1999).
166. JONES, supra note 165, at 217; Price, supra note 36, at 753; Reece,
supra note 80, at 191-92; Smith, supra note 165, at 237-38.
167. Black, supra note 25, at 96-104; John G. Fleming, Probabilistic
Causation in Tort Law: A Postscript, 70 CANADIAN B. REV. 136, 140 (1991);
Smith, supra note 165, at 237-38.
168. See B.C. Elec. R. Co. v. Clarke [1950] 3 D.L.R. 161 (Can.) (determining
that "Dupuytren's contracture" resulted from trauma to plaintiffs hand because
trauma causes the condition 15 percent of the time and all other causes were
eliminated).
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Note that the Commonwealth courts require plaintiffs to prove
actionable damage by a preponderance of evidence without regard to
whether the proof involves past facts or hypothetical facts. If
defendant negligently omits to provide plaintiff with a safety device,
for example, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence
that she would have used the device (and thus not been injured) in
order to show causation even though the question of what the
plaintiff would have done if given the device is hypothetical.'" The
distinction between past facts and hypothetical facts only applies
when the courts value losses where actionable damage has been
established by a preponderance of evidence.
Restricting probabilistic proof to the valuation issue is such a
powerful limiting principle that the need for additional limiting
principles may not be vital. As long as courts require proof of
traditional actionable damage by a preponderance of evidence, the
specter of greatly expanded liability presented by the Tug example'73
cannot occur. Probabilistic causation is restricted to valuing harm
in a very limited class of cases, those where plaintiff has proven his
right to recover damages. It is only when courts recognize nontraditional damage, such as loss of a chance or interference with
autonomy, that the specter of unlimited liability arises.
United States courts also sometimes award damages for harm
in proportion to the risk. " ' They do so by applying the doctrine that
plaintiff must prove the existence of some harm by the
preponderance of evidence, but he can prove the extent of the harm
with as much certainty as the circumstances permit."- Courts
necessarily take chance into account when estimating the extent of
the loss. ' 3 In personal injury cases, for example, loss of earning

169. See Sellars v. Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 120 A.L.R. 16 (Austl.);

Allied Maples Group Ltd. v. Simmons & Simmons, 4 All E.R. 907 (Eng. CA
1995).

170. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

171. See infranote 173-77.
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 912 (1977) (stating this rule).
173. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1373-76;
see, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990). A surgeon negligently

damaged plaintiffs intestine in the course of an operation, creating an 8 percent
to 16 percent risk of a future bowel obstruction. Id. at 477. The court held that
plaintiff could recover for this future damage reduced by the chance that it

would not occur. Id. at 483-84 (adopting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912
(1977)); see also United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995).

Defendant's failure to diagnose testicular cancer caused it to spread,
necessitating additional surgery and chemotherapy; it also caused a 15 percent
chance of recurrence of testicular cancer. Id. at 75. The chance of recurrence
would have been almost 0 percent if the diagnosis had been prompt. Id. The
court held that because defendant caused physical harm, plaintiff can recover
for the increased risk of future cancer as an element of damages. The court
rejected the all or nothing rule because plaintiffs life expectancy was shortened
by this risk. Id.
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capacity is often a major component of damages. 174 A permanent
physical injury itself is frequently sufficient evidence to show that
"some" loss of earning capacity has occurred. 17' The extent of the
loss, however, can be highly speculative, particularly in the case of a
young plaintiff who has not completed his education and embarked
on a career. Courts granting such awards often discount the
recovery by the plaintiffs chance of succeeding in the career. 17"
Thus, a person disabled by a tortfeasor while aspiring to a career
would receive a smaller award than a person disabled after
establishing himself in the career."'
The United States cases, however, have not consistently
awarded damages for future harm discounted by the probability that
the harm will occur. They sometimes require plaintiffs to prove
future harm by a preponderance of evidence, and deny all recovery
where plaintiff cannot show that such harm will more likely than
not occur. 78 A common example is measuring damages for future
lost profits of a business.
It is difficult to predict when United States courts will apply the
all or nothing rule and when they will award damages discounted by
the risk of loss. They do, however, appear more likely to award
damages discounted for future losses when plaintiff has shown a
present harm and the trier of fact can reasonably infer that it will
continue. 8 ' Cases involving loss of earning capacity stemming from
a physical injury are a prime example. Courts are less likely to
award discounted damages when plaintiff shows that she has
suffered one type of harm (breathing problems caused by toxic dust)
and asserts that another type of harm (cancer) may occur in the
future.' Where a different type of harm is claimed, however, courts
are more likely to accept plaintiffs position and award discounted
damages where plaintiff has a severe physical injury. 82 Thus, where
plaintiff suffered a severe skull injury, courts have permitted
recovery for a small enhanced risk of having epileptic seizures in the

2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 157, at 370.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp., 7 A.D.2d 436, 437 (N.Y. 1959). An
accident caused hearing loss to an opera student that precluded her from
pursuing a professional opera career. Id. The court approved recovery for loss
of opportunity to pursue her career, but limited damages to $20,000 because "in
the case of persons of rare and special talents many are called but few are
chosen. For those who are not chosen, the probabilities of exploiting their
talents financially are minimal or totally negative." Id.
174.

178. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 235

(2d ed.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Hornbook Series 1993).
Id.
2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 157, at 407.
Id.
Thompson, supra note 41, at 461-65.
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futurelu or developing meningitis in the future. ' 8
Where plaintiff has not suffered severe injury, however, courts
are less likely to award damages for other types of harm that are
unlikely to occur."u In asbestos exposure cases, for example, some
courts regard subcellular or cellular damage that has not given rise
to a present disease as actionable damage, and permit recovery for
present harm such as mental distress arising from a fear of getting
cancer in the future.8 8 They do not, however, permit recovery for
the future disease itself unless it is more likely than not to occur, in
which case they award damages for all of the harm that the disease
is likely to cause.187 Under the traditional rule, a plaintiff that could
not prove the future disease was more likely than not to occur would
recover no compensation for that disease."' The modern trend in
such cases, however, is to allow plaintiff to split his cause of action,
and bring a later suit for the disease if it should occur.'"
Awarding damages for future disease reduced by the probability
that the disease will occur can be justified on deterrence grounds.
Such cases involve proportional risk recovery for future losses that
can be insured against. Our earlier analysis' suggests that
awarding discounted damages is appropriate because they represent
the sum necessary to pay for the insurance against the risk of loss
that the defendant imposed on plaintiff.
Awarding appropriate damages in such cases, however,
presents a serious practical problem. This is the inability to
estimate accurately such future losses. Experience in mass tort
class action cases shows that expert estimates of future harm caused
by carcinogens such as asbestos are often wildly inaccurate.'9 ' Often
the superior solution in future disease cases is to allow plaintiff to
split her cause of action and bring a second suit in the event that
she actually contracts the disease in the future. This solution is

183. Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)
(testifying to a 5 percent risk of epileptic seizures).
184. Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 680 (Or. 1973) (stressing

plaintiffs "susceptibility" to contracting meningitis).
185. Thompson, supranote 41, at 462-65.
186. Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 263 (N.J. 1989)
(allowing recovery for emotional distress).

187. Id. at 259-60.
188. Thompson, supra note 41, at 464; e.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc.,

765 S.W.2d 42, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that toxic exposure is
actionable if the "exposure had induced some biological manifestation from

which the anticipated cancer is reasonably certain to occur-as quantified by
expert testimony as a probability of occurrence greater than fifty percent"), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).
189. Mauro, 561 A.2d at 266; see also 2 DOBBS, LAW OFREMEDIES, supranote
157, at 410.
190. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
191. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: the Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1361-62, 1432-33 (1995).
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practical in cases where the damages caused by the future disease
are large enough to finance a second lawsuit. Lung cancer caused
by asbestos exposure is an example.
In many cases, however, the future disease is not serious
enough to make a second lawsuit practical. An example is arthritis
caused by a knee injury. In such cases the right to bring a separate
suit is an illusory remedy because the cost of the suit might well
exceed the amount of damages that plaintiff would recover. In such
cases the fairness considerations discussed in Part III. C suggest
that plaintiff be given a proportional recovery in the original lawsuit
if there is some reasonable basis for estimating the future loss. It is
true that the estimate is likely to be inaccurate, but the defendant is
a proven wrongdoer that has caused an identified injury. It is better
that she pay somewhat speculative damages for the future disease
caused by that injury than that she pay nothing.
This reasoning suggests that plaintiffs should be presently
compensated for other future repercussions of a present injury by a
sum reduced by the chance that the future harm will not occur.
With some future harm, such as pain and suffering and medical
expenses, it may be possible to wait and see if it occurs, and allow a
subsequent action to recover for it. This would normally be
impractical, however, because the amount of loss would not be large
enough to justify a second suit.
With other future harms stemming from a present injury, such
as lost earnings and lost profits, it is often impossible to wait and
see if they occur in the future. This is because the defendant's
wrongful conduct altered the future. We can never know, for
example, how much a disabled child would have earned if he had not
been disabled. These damages do not fall neatly in the proportional
risk recovery classification because we can never know whether the
insurable event (his failure to achieve the earning capacity that he
would have had as a non-disabled person) occurred. Therefore, the
plaintiff cannot use the tort recovery to buy insurance against the
future loss. The best he could do is invest the recovery, and use the
principal and income to supplement his wages. This would lead to
overcompensation of plaintiffs whose earnings would not have been
impaired and undercompensation of plaintiffs whose earnings would
have been impaired.
Deterrence aside, simple fairness justifies recovery for lost
earnings and profits. Defendant has tortiously caused an injury
that prevents plaintiff from ever knowing what earnings and profits
the plaintiff would have accumulated in the future. 9 " It is better
that plaintiff recover something on the basis of the best estimate
possible, even if it is based on averages, than that she recover
nothing.
Fairness also justifies discounted recovery for
192. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance, supra note 46, at 1378; King,
Reduction ofLikelihood, supranote 27, at 529-35.
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repercussions of a present injury that may occur in the future (such
as a future illness) if splitting the cause of action is impractical.
These recoveries do not risk excessive liability because they are
restricted to valuing harm arising from a proven tort. Courts have
valued harm in this way for many years with no apparent adverse
consequences.
V.

Loss OF A CHANCE WHERE TRADITIONAL DAMAGE
IS NOT PROVEN
This section is concerned with tort cases requiring proof of
damage as an element of the cause of action, but where plaintiff
cannot prove by a preponderance of evidence that defendant caused
a traditionally recognized form of actionable damage. What plaintiff
can prove is that defendant deprived plaintiff of a less than 50
percent chance of avoiding a harm or obtaining a benefit.
The increasing minority of United States courts that accept the
loss of a chance doctrine in this context apply it primarily in medical
malpractice cases involving improper diagnosis or treatment. There
are two major approaches. The first takes a relaxed approach to
causation. These courts recognize that the actionable damage is the
harmful consequence of the disease, but they permit plaintiffs to
recover all of their harm even though their evidence is insufficient to
show that the failure to diagnose or treat caused the damage. '
These courts still require juries to find that the failure to diagnose
or treat the illness caused the damage;" however, they no longer
require plaintiff to introduce evidence sufficient to support that
finding. Thus, plaintiff can prevail by introducing evidence showing
that the physician deprived plaintiff of a less than 50 percent chance
of avoiding the harmful consequence. 9 ' Whether plaintiffs actually
recover compensation for all of their harm in such cases is unclear.
A leading case adopting the relaxed causation approach states that
"juries often discount damages according to the statistical evidence
in order to accurately evaluate the true loss." '" Our previous
analysis suggests that using relaxed causation in medical
malpractice cases may be justified on deterrence grounds if it in fact
imposes excessive liability because physicians apparently often
escape liability.197 While application of the relaxed causation
193. See Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz.
1984) (en banc); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 180 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974) (per curiam), affd., 337 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1975); 1 DOBBS, THE LW:
OF TORTS, supranote 7, at § 178, at 435.
194. Thompson, 688 P.2d at 616; Kallenberg,45 A.D.2d at 180.

195. Thompson, 688 P.2d at 614 (explaining that evidence must show
defendant "deprived plaintiff of some significant chance of survival or better
recovery"); Kallenberg, 45 A.D.2d at 179 (showing a 20 percent to 40 percent
chance of survival).
196. Thompson, 688 P.2d at 616.
197. See supranotes 92-112 and accompanying text.
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approach to medical malpractice cases is new, the approach itself,
which is discussed later in this Article,9 8 is not new.
The second approach in medical malpractice cases is to
recognize the chance of a cure as a thing of value, 9 ' and to grant
recovery for destruction of that chance rather than for causation of
the adverse consequence of the disease."'0 Courts adopting this
approach often measure plaintiffs damages by reducing
compensation for the harm caused by the disease by the percentage
chance that treatment would not have cured the disease.2"' Our
earlier policy analysis shows that this second approach is fully
supported by the autonomy theory,0 2 but is supported by deterrence
considerations only in cases involving recurring misses and
proportional risk recovery. 203
Courts in Commonwealth countries reject use of loss of a chance
in the medical malpractice context.20 4 They often apply the theory,
however, in cases of economic loss. 25 These courts initially applied
the theory in legal malpractice cases, where, for example, a lawyer
negligently fails to file a suit within the period of limitation,"' or
negligently drafts a contract creating a risk that the client will be
subject to future economic loss, 0 7 or negligently fails to advise a
198. See discussion infra Part VI of this Article.
199. Murrey v. United States, 73 F.3d 1448, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Wendland
v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 1998); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462
N.W.2d 44, 57 (Mich. 1990); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 684
(Mo. 1992).
200. Wendland, 574 N.W.2d at 331; Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 57; Wollen, 828
S.W.2d at 684; Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991).
201. Murrey, 73 F.3d at 1453 (Illinois law allows compensation for loss of a
chance); Wendland, 574 N.W.2d at 329-30 (failure to resuscitate patient
destroyed a less than 50 percent chance of survival); Delaney v. Cade,
873 P.2d 175, 177 (Kan. 1994) (loss of chance to avoid paralysis); Falcon,
462 N.W.2d at 49 (failure to take precautions prior to delivery of child that
would have increased the chance the physician could have effectively treated an
embolism arising as a complication of birth); Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 682 (failure
to diagnose); Perez, 805 P.2d 589 (wrongful death; failure to diagnose disease
increased risk of death); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 399 (N.J. 1990)
(involving wrongful death of infant born prematurely where the failure to treat
pregnant mother increased risk of premature birth); Roberts v. Ohio
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 481 (Ohio 1996) (wrongful
death); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 469 (Okla. 1987)
(wrongful death; failure to diagnose).
202. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
203. See supranotes 133-51 and accompanying text.
204. Hotson v. E. Berkshire Area Health Auth., 2 All E.R. 909 (Eng. H.L.
1987); Kenyon v. Bell, 1953 S.C. 125 (Scot. 1952); Sullivan v. Micallef, No.
BC13956, 1994 N.S.W. LEXIS 13956 (Austl.); Laferriere v. Lawson [1991] 1
S.C.R. 541 (Can.).
205. See infra notes 259-91 and accompanying text.
206. E.g., Prior v. McNab, [1976] 16 O.R. 2d 380 (Can.); Yeoman v. Ferries,
1967 S.L.T. 332 (Scot. 1967); see also Kyle v. P & J Stormonth Darling, 1994
S.L.T. 191 (Scot. 1992) (appeal dismissed because of violation of a rule).
207. D.W. Moore & Co. v. Ferrier, 1 All E.R. 400 (Eng. C.A. 1987) (negligent
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client about a legal problem that the client3 would have attempted to
resolve if she had known about it in time.-0
Relying on the "chance has value" rationale,2"' these courts
routinely grant proportional recovery.211 That is, they measure
damages by discounting the loss that the client incurred (or the
benefit that the client failed to receive) by the chance that the client
would have incurred the loss had the malpractice not occurred.
Legal malpractice cases can be brought in the Commonwealth on
either a contract or a tort theory.21 ' The loss of a chance theory is
applied in the same way regardless of whether the suit is brought in
tort or contract.1 2 The authorities tend to grant a discounted
recovery even when the chance of gain is greater than 50 percent.1 3
drafting of a covenant not to compete gave rise to a tort cause of action at the
time the contract was drafted).
208. Graybriar Indus. Ltd. v. Davis & Co., [1990] 21 A.C.W.S. 3d 273 (Can.)
(Lawyer negligently failed to advise client who was about to enter into a real
estate joint venture that the other party owned land in trust rather than in fee
simple. Thus, the client ended up with less security than he thought he had.
Client proved that he would have attempted to negotiate a better deal if he had
known about this. The court awarded plaintiff damages for loss of opportunity
to negotiate a better deal, but the damages were discounted because of the risk
that the negotiation would be unsuccessful.); Allied Maples Group Ltd. v.
Simmons & Simmons, 4 All E.R. 907 (Eng. CA. 1995) (Lawyer failed to advise
client adequately of potential liability resulting from the purchase of certain
real estate. If client had been properly advised, he would have attempted to
obtain a warranty, or other protection, from seller. Lawyer held liable to client
for losses resulting from failure of client to obtain the warranty or other
protection, but damages are discounted because the seller might have been
unwilling to give the warranty or other protection.). The New Zealand cases are
divided on the question of whether to apply the loss of a chance approach in this
situation. The cases are discussed in JONES, supra note 165.
209. D.W. Moore & Co. v. Ferrier, 1 All E.R. 400 (Eng. CA. 19871 (The
negligent drafting of covenant not to compete gave rise to a tort cause of action
at the time the contract was drafted and not at the time the partner subject to
the covenant left the firm. This is because a properly drafted covenant had
value at the time of contracting. Damages are to be determined as of the time
of contracting by taking into account the chance that the partner would leave
the firm in the future.). Failing to file a suit within the statute of limitations
causes the plaintiff a loss because a case "with a fifty per cent chance of success
has a definite 'settlement value." WADDAMs, THE LAw OF DIAGES, supra note
61, at 13.290.
210. John G. Fleming, ProbabilisticCausationin Tort Law, 68 CANADIAN B.
REV. 661, 674 (1989).
211. Id.

212. Id.; Geoff Masel, Damages in Tort for Loss of Chance, 1 TORTS L.J. 43,
44 (1995); Perry, supra note 36, at 312; Reece, supra note 80, at 190; Smith,
supranote 165, at 233.

213. See First Interstate Bank of Cal. v. Cohen, 1 P.N.L.R. 17 (Eng. C-A.

1995) (involving a negligent misrepresentation case where plaintiff recovered
66.66 percent of his damages because if the misrepresentation had not been
made, plaintiff would have had a 66.66 percent chance of avoiding a loss).
Other authorities are discussed in Cooper, supra note 64, at 45-46. Note that
the Commonwealth courts could grant a full recovery in cases where the chance
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Commonwealth courts have applied the principle in other
economic loss cases as well. Sellars v. Adelaide Petroleum NL 214 is
the leading Australian case. In Sellars the directors of a company
decided to restructure the company by selling some shares. The
directors entered into parallel negotiations with the defendant and
another entity for the sale of the shares. The other entity made a
favorable offer for the purchase, and the directors came close to
reaching an agreement with it that was subject to a number of
conditions precedent. The directors broke off negotiations with the
other entity, however, because defendant's agent misrepresented
that the defendant would buy the shares under even more favorable
terms. After the deal with the defendant fell through, the other
entity withdrew its earlier offer, and was willing to deal only on less
favorable terms. Plaintiffs sued defendant, claiming that the
misrepresentation caused them to lose the commercial opportunity
to enter into the more favorable agreement with the other entity.
Plaintiffs filed suit under a statute permitting recovery only for
misrepresentations that cause actual "loss or damage." 20 The trial
court found that in the absence of defendant's misrepresentation,
plaintiffs would have entered into the more favorable agreement
with the other entity. The judge also found that there was only a 40
percent chance that all of the conditions precedent would have been
satisfied, and thus, that this agreement would have become
effective. Based on this, defendant argued that plaintiff was unable
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that it suffered an actual
loss as required by the statute. While acknowledging that damages
were the "gist of the cause of action," the court found them to be
present by accepting the "chance has value" theory. 216 The court
held that the loss of a 40 percent chance of obtaining a commercial
benefit is a thing of value." Thus, the loss of a chance that has
value is a form of economic loss.1 8 Furthermore, plaintiffs proved
that defendant caused them to lose this chance for commercial
benefit because, but for the misrepresentation, they would have
entered into the contract with the other entity.219 Even though the
suit in Sellers was brought for violation of a statute requiring
"actual loss," the court stated that the same approach applies to tort
20
cases involving loss of commercial opportunity.
of causation is greater than 50 percent on the grounds that plaintiffs can prove
traditional damage in such cases. The Commonwealth approach of granting a
proportional recovery both when the chance of causation is greater than 50
percent and when it is 50 percent or less can be justified on deterrence grounds.
214. (1994) 120 A.L.R. 16 (Austl.).
215. Id. at 18 (citing Trade Practices Act 1974 § 82(1)).
216. Id. at 33.
217. Id. at 37.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 40.

220. Id.
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In Davies v. Taylor,21 the English court applied an approach
consistent with Sellers in a wrongful death case.
A widow who
was separated from her husband prior to his death brought a
wrongful death action against the tortfeasor that caused the
death.2 In order to recover, the widow had to show an injury in the
form of the financial loss that she suffered as a result of his death.
To show the loss, the court required her to prove a substantial
chance or probability that she would have returned to her husband
had he lived. The court held that this chance could be less than 50
percent, but damages were to be calculated by reducing the amount
of support she would have received, if she had been living with her
husband, by the probability of her not returning to him. ' The court
held that she was entitled to no damages in this case, however,
because she was able to show only a speculative, and not a
substantial, chance that she would have returned to her husband.'
The Irish case of Fryers v University of Ulster is also similar to
Sellers. Plaintiff brought a claim in an Industrial Tribunal against
the University of Ulster for sex discrimination. Plaintiff applied for
employment with the University and proved that due to gender
discrimination she was not put on the short interview list of
prospective employees. The tribunal found, that had she been "short
listed," she would have had a one-in-four chance of being hired. The
primary basis for this finding was that there would have been four
people on the interview list. The Industrial Tribunal took the 25
percent chance of getting the job into account in calculating
plaintiffs financial losses. The Court of Appeal agreed with the
Tribunal's approach and affirmed its findings."
The Commonwealth cases use the "chance has value" rationale
for granting proportional recovery in economic loss cases. This
theory is convenient because it allows the courts to grant recovery
without eliminating the requirement of actionable damages.Z
Commonwealth courts still adhere to the damage requiremente by
insisting that plaintiff prove non-traditional actionable damage (the
loss of a chance) by a preponderance of evidence.
One of the ways the Commonwealth courts limit application of

221. 1974 A.C. 207 (Eng. H.L. 1972).
222. Id. at 209.
223. Id. at 212.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 213.
226. N.I.C.F. 2668 (Transcript) (N. Ir. 1998).
227. Id.
228. King, Causation,Valuation, and Chance, supranote 46, at 1394-95.
229. Lesley J. Anderson, Loss of a Chance in Tort, 131 SOLIC. J. 1258, 1261
(1987); Coote, supra note 76, at 768; Charles Foster, A Plea for a Lost Chance:
Hotson Reconsidered (pt.2), 145 NEw L.J. 248 (Feb. 24, 1995); Tony Honord,
Medical Non-Disclosure, Causationand Risk: Chappel v. Hart, 7 TORTS L.J. 1,
6-7 (1999).
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loss of a chance is by the restrictive way they interpret the
actionable damage requirement. They require plaintiff to show that
defendant caused the loss of a chance by showing that plaintiff
would have taken the chance if given that option. 2 ' The practical
effect of this distinction is to require plaintiff to prove what she
would have done (that she would have taken advantage of the
opportunity) by a balance of probabilities, and to prove what others
would have done (that opportunities dependent on actions of others
would have been successful) by a lower standard.
Whether this restriction applies in a given case depends, of
course, on who the plaintiff is. In the Tug example, used earlier, 23
the barge owner's claim against the manufacturer for failure to
equip the tug with a radio hinges in part on the conduct of a third
party, i.e., would the tug operator have used the radio (premise two)
and heeded the weather report by changing direction (premise four).
If the tug operator owned the tug and sued the manufacturer for
storm damage to the tug, then premises two and four would pertain
to the plaintiffs conduct. Many actions hinge on the conduct of both
the plaintiff and of third persons. In Sellars, the misrepresentation
caused economic loss if plaintiff would have entered into the other
contract in the absence of the misrepresentation (plaintiffs conduct)
and if the contact would have proven profitable (conduct of
numerous third parties).n2
Whether to apply loss of a chance to what plaintiff would have
done is a very important issue. Doing so will open the door to using
the loss of a chance approach in a wide range of tort cases where
courts currently do not apply it. These actions include failure to
provide a warning that plaintiff might not have heeded,233 failure to
provide a safety device that plaintiff might not have used,234 failure
to obtain informed consent for a medical procedure that plaintiff
might have undergone even with full information,2 3' and making
misrepresentations that might not have influenced plaintiffs
behavior."G
Restricting loss of a chance to third party behavior effectively
limits the use of probabilistic causation, but it is not clear that this
distinction is sound.'
What the plaintiff would have done if
230. Allied Maples Group Ltd. v. Simmons & Simmons, 4 All E.R. 907 (Eng.
C.A. 1995); Sellars v. Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 120 A.L.R. 16 (Austl.);
JONES, supra note 165, at 220; Coote, supra note 76, at 768; Masel, supra note
212, at 44, 46-47.
231. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
232. Sellars, (1994) 120 A.L.R. 16 (Austl.).
233. Boivin, supranote 107, at 86; Masel, supra note 212, at 44-45.
234. Masel, supra note 212, at 44-45.
235. Id. at 44-45, 49; Waddams, Assessment of Uncertainties,supra note 54,
at 71; Waddams, The Valuation of Chances, supra note 99, at 94.
236. Reece, supranote 80, at 199.
237. A number of Commonwealth scholars have pointed out the lack of a
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presented with the opportunity is just as easily characterized as
involving a loss of a chance that has value." Assume, for example,
that defendant makes a misrepresentation that deprives plaintiff of
an opportunity to make an investment that later proved to be
successful, e.g., to invest in a commodity or business that later
increased in value. Assume also that there was only a 40 percent
chance that plaintiff would have made the investment if given the
opportunity. In a very real sense the misrepresentation deprived
plaintiff of a 40 percent chance of profiting from the investment.
The same reasoning applies to cases involving physical harm. A
doctor may fail to diagnose plaintiffs disease under circumstances
where the chance of a cure with proper treatment is 100 percent, but
there is only a 40 percent chance that plaintiff would consent to the
treatment. By failing to diagnose the disease, the doctor has
deprived plaintiff of a 40 percent chance of a cure because with
proper diagnosis there was a 40 percent chance that plaintiff would
have availed himself of the treatment and been cured.2
In addition, Levmore argues that deterrence can often be
advanced by applying loss of a chance to the question of what the
plaintiff would have done when the case involved a "recurring
miss."2 4 His examples include failure to warn cases and informed
consent cases where only a small fraction of the recipients of the
information would have altered their behavior.4"1
A possible justification for the Commonwealth approach to loss
of a chance (reducing plaintiffs burden of proving what others would
have done) is that it is much easier for plaintiff to prove how he
would have reacted in hypothetical circumstances than to prove how
others would have reacted.242 On close examination, difficulty of
proof does not justify the Commonwealth distinction for two reasons.
First, to the extent that testimony can establish what a person
would have done in hypothetical circumstances, it is equally easy for
plaintiff to prove what he would have done (by testifying) and to
prove what a third party would have done (by calling the third party
as a witness).2 3 Second, proving what the plaintiff would have done
in hypothetical circumstances can be extremely difficult. We can
only really speculate about how a plaintiff would have responded to

logical basis for this distinction. JONES, supra note 165, at 220; WADDAZIS, THE
LAW OF DAMAGES, supra note 61, at I 13.360; Masel, supra note 212, at 44;
Reece, supra note 80, at 198-204; Waddams, The Valuation of Chances, supra
note 99, at 92-94.
238. Masel, supra note 212, at 44; Waddams, The Valuation of Chances,
supranote 99, at 94.
239. Reece, supranote 80, at 189.
240. Levmore, supranote 128, at 706.
24L Id.
242. Black, supranote 25, at 102.
243. Evans, supra note 54, at 91.

HeinOnline -- 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 647 2001

648

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

a non-existent stimuli such as a warning.2" Plaintiffs testimony
about what he would have done (such as whether he would have
heeded a warning) is itself highly speculative. 4 5 For this reason
some courts will not even admit plaintiffs testimony into evidence. 24
Even jurisdictions that admit plaintiffs testimony may give it very
little weight because it is so speculative and self-serving.
In fact, the problem of proving how the plaintiff would have
behaved in hypothetical circumstances is so difficult that courts
have created a variety of special rules to deal with it. In products
liability failure to warn cases, some courts have informally relaxed
plaintiffs burden of proving that she would have read and heeded
the warning, permitting her to get to the jury on the basis of very
thin evidence. 7 Others have created a presumption that a proper
warning would have been read and heeded.248
In medical
malpractice informed consent cases, some courts now use an
objective test. For example, Canada uses a "modified objective test"
for determining whether plaintiff would have declined treatment if
given full information about the risk of treatment, i.e., would "a
reasonable person having the patient's249 tastes, beliefs and
characteristics... have declined treatment."
Actually, the difficulty of proving the hypothetical conduct of
the plaintiff provides a compelling argument against using loss of a
chance with respect to this issue." ° Reliable evidence regarding how
a given plaintiff, or all plaintiffs as a group, would have reacted to a
given piece of information is almost never available. 2 1' A jury
finding that there was a 10 percent chance or a 40 percent chance
that plaintiff would have heeded a warning if it had been given
would frequently be based on speculation. Of course, this argument
also suggests that the loss of a chance theory should not apply to the
question of what others would have done because that issue is
equally speculative. The least speculative loss of a chance claims
are against physicians for failure to diagnose or treat a disease. The
policy against permitting judgments to be based on speculation lend
support to the approach of United States courts in limiting loss of a
chance to medical malpractice cases. In these cases, the United
States courts apply loss of a chance to the issue of whether the
disease could be cured, but not to the issue of whether the plaintiff
would have elected the treatment. The opportunity for a cure is
244. Boivin, supra note 107, at 75-76. This is true whether we use an
objective or a subjective test. Id. at 76.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 87 n.186 (citing authorities).
247. David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Product Liability Failure to
Warn Cases, 17 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 271, 274-75 (1995) (citing authorities).
248. Id.
249. Waddams, The Valuation of Chances, supra note 99, at 93.
250. Price, supra note 36, at 754-60; Stauch, supra note 111, at 222.
251. Stauch, supranote 111, at 222.
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often largely dependent on physical forces such as the etiology of
plaintiffs disease, and we often have fairly good statistics
concerning the chance of a cure. =2
Professor Perry's autonomy rationale does provide a coherent
basis for distinguishing between plaintiff behavior and third party
behavior. Professor Perry finds an interference with autonomy only
when defendant's undertaking or misrepresentation causes plaintiff
to lose an opportunity to follow a preferable course of action (loss of
a chance). 2- Plaintiff can only show that defendant caused plaintiff
to lose this chance by proving that plaintiff relied to his detriment
on the undertaking or misrepresentation.- Detrimental reliance is
necessary because autonomy implies as much freedom to reject the
chance as to take it. If, in the absence of defendant's conduct,
plaintiff would have rejected the chance, then defendant's conduct
did not cause plaintiff to lose the chance." If plaintiff would have
taken the chance, then the interference with autonomy caused him
to lose the chance. Therefore, plaintiff must prove that he would
have taken the chance in order to show that the interference with
autonomy caused the loss of the chance.
We have seen that the United States practice of applying loss of
a chance to medical malpractice actions arguably furthers
deterrence in some, and perhaps all, instances.5' Furthermore,
these cases have smaller proof problems than other cases. It
appears possible for courts to make realistic estimates of the
magnitude of the lost chance in those cases where they have the aid
of scientific studies. Such studies are possible because the chance
usually depends on the etiology of a disease or the characteristics of
an injury rather than on human behavior.
We have found less justification for the British Commonwealth
cases. Applying loss of a chance in economic loss cases requires
courts to make fairly speculative estimates of chance. Furthermore,
the distinction between what plaintiff would have done and what
others would have done appears arbitrary unless courts adopt the
autonomy theory. It is not at all clear that the Commonwealth
courts are applying loss of a chance because they desire to protect
autonomy. Cases like Davies v. Taylor - 3 (widow's wrongful death
action) and Fryers v. University of Ulster (gender discrimination)
252. Black, supra note 25, at 104; Ellis, supra note 27, at 393; Scott, supra
note 110, at 524; Stauch, supra note 111, at 206; Vern R Walker, Direct
Inference in the Lost Chance Cases: Factfinding Constraints under Minimal
Fairnessto Parties,23 HOFSTRAL. REv. 247, 252-53, 292 (1994).
253. See discussion supraPart I. B of this Article.
254. Perry, supra note 36.
255. Boivin, supranote 107, at 86.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 116-56 and accompanying text.
258. 1974 A.C. 207 (Eng. ILL. 1972).
259. N.I.C.F. 2668 (Transcript) (N. Ir. 1998).
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would have been decided differently under the autonomy theory
because there was no detrimental reliance on an undertaking or
misrepresentation.
VI. THE ROLE OF CASE-SPECIFIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The analysis above demonstrates that general policy
considerations-such as autonomy, fairness, deterrence, and
difficulty of proof-are sometimes helpful as limiting principles. But
they are not powerful enough to dictate a general loss of a chance
rule for resolving all causation issues for all torts. That is, we
cannot say that courts should always, or never, apply loss of a
chance to such issues as plaintiffs hypothetical conduct, third
parties' hypothetical conduct, and physical forces of nature. This is
because each case is affected to some extent by specialized policy
considerations. These considerations may often weigh heavily
enough to dictate whether, and to what extent, courts will deviate
from the requirement that plaintiff prove traditional damage by a
preponderance of evidence.
In a leading article written in 1956, Professor Wex Malone
described the role of policy in determining the level of proof of
causation required by courts.2 0 He contended that courts require
enough evidence of causation to enforce effectively the policy behind
the rule of law in question. 211 If a rule of law is quite exacting
because it is based on strong moral considerations, courts are likely
to hold the violator of such a rule liable "for any harm that can be
26 2
causally associated in any plausible way with his wrongdoing."
Liability of intentional wrongdoers is an example. 22 Furthermore,
where the rule of conduct was designed to protect against the exact
risk to which plaintiff was exposed, courts are likely to let plaintiff
get to the jury on a minimal showing of causation.! Malone cites
liability of shipowners for failure to rescue sailors who fall overboard
as an example.265 Courts have been quite willing to submit such
cases to juries, even when the chance of a rescue appeared quite
slim.2 6 On the other hand, Malone found that courts take a
different view if a rule is less well entrenched either because it is
new, it is designed to protect against a narrow scope of risks, or it
represents a small departure from acceptable conduct. 267 With
respect to such rules courts are likely to require plaintiffs to make a

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Malone, supra note 57, at 72-77.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 73.
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clear showing of causation in order to recover damages.-' Malone
cites medical malpractice misdiagnosis cases as involving policy
considerations that favor defendants.
Consequently, courts--at
the time he wrote-required plaintiffs to meet a stringent standard
in proving causation.
We have seen that this is still the rule in
British Commonwealth countries and in the majority of United
States courts. A growing minority of United States courts have
changed their minds about malpractice misdiagnosis cases, however,
and have relaxed the standard of proof considerably. Yet, Malone's
basic observation still holds true. There are some cases where
courts hold plaintiffs to a rigorous standard for proving causation in
fact and other cases where they hold plaintiffs to a very lax
standard.
Malone's thesis that for policy reasons courts sometimes relax
traditional causation requirements is important for our purposes.
This is because loss of a chance cases can be viewed as more
moderate instances of the relaxed approach to causation that
Malone identified. The cases Malone discussed permitted plaintiff
to recover full damages upon a showing of a mere possibility of
causation whereas the loss of a chance cases permit only a reduced
recovery of damages upon such a showing. The two lines of United
States malpractice cases discussed previously illustrate this; one
permits full recovery and the other permits partial recovery. In
short, a court's view of the position that the parties occupy in
society, including the need to protect against overdeterrence, may
help explain its decisions concerning the burden of proving
causation.
Malone's thesis provides a justification for the different
approaches to medical malpractice cases taken by courts in the
United States and in the Commonwealth countries. In a useful
extension of Malone's work, Professors Twerski and Sebok point out
that United States courts now show much less deference to the
medical profession than they did when Malone wrote.2 This may
explain their increased willingness to allow malpractice recovery
when the likelihood of causation is less than 50 percent. Recent
studies in the United States show that medical malpractice causes

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-88.
For a discussion of recent cases, see DOBBs, THE L,,w OF TORTS, supra

note 7, at § 174. According to Twerski and Sebok, cases that continue to require
proof of causation by a preponderance of evidence include those where shopping
centers are sued for negligent failure to provide security guards to protect
customers from criminal attack. Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability
Without Cause? FurtherRuminations on Cause-in-Factas Applied to Handgun

Liability, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1379, 1385 (2000).
272. Id. at 1382 n.12.
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more deaths each year than motor vehicle accidents, 73 the
overwhelming majority of instances of medical malpractice are
never pursued by victims,274 and that defendants win a much higher
percentage of medical malpractice cases that do go to trial than
other types of cases.275 Under these circumstances it may be entirely
appropriate for United States courts to embrace the loss of a chance
approach in medical malpractice cases. Yet, the United States
approach may not be right for the Commonwealth countries. They
have a medical delivery system that differs dramatically from the
United States system, 6 and it may well create problems very
different from those seen in the United States. Furthermore,
Commonwealth courts place far less emphasis on deterrence as a
legitimate function of tort law than do United States courts.
Therefore, the high deference that Commonwealth courts give to
medical professionals may well be appropriate because of the
circumstances that prevail in those countries.
Malone's thesis also helps explain why courts have not
embraced loss of a chance in physical injury cases not involving
medical malpractice. The kinds of physical harm cases that are
most appropriate for loss of a chance are those where courts have
already given plaintiff the benefit of a drastically reduced burden of
proof that is far more beneficial to plaintiffs than use of probabilistic
causation. In the cases Malone discussed, such as the failure to
rescue a sailor that has been washed overboard, plaintiffs usually
recover full damages even though they lost only a slim chance of a
rescue.277 There are other examples than those discussed by Malone.
For example, many United States courts use a presumption of
causation in products liability failure to warn cases.
The
presumption often produces a result more favorable to plaintiffs
than the loss of a chance theory would because it allows for full
rather than partial recovery. In cases using these relaxed causation
approaches, plaintiffs have little incentive to ask the court to adopt
a probabilistic rule since a probabilistic approach will usually
273. To ERR is HuMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYsTEM 27-42 (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 2000).

274. Peters, supra note 132 (reviewing the literature and describing studies
that show only one claim is filed for every five to ten negligently inflicted
injuries).
275. Id. (reviewing the literature and reporting that studies show
malpractice plaintiffs win about 30 percent of their cases; this is about one-half
as many cases as automobile accident victims win). Other studies show that
juries are more tolerant of malpractice defendants than are other physicians.

Id.
276. Jennifer R. Weinman, Comment, A Deteriorationof Health: A Critical
Analysis of Health Care Systems, Medical Malpractice,and No-Fault Insurance
in Canada,GreatBritain, and the United States, 14 HOus. J. INT'L L. 425 (1992)
(describing the universal health insurance in Canada and the National Health

Service in England).
277. Malone, supra note 57, at 76-77.
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operate to their disadvantage.' Defendants in such cases may also
be reluctant to ask the court to adopt a probabilistic rule for
strategic reasons of their own. When no party asks the court to
adopt a probabilistic rule, the court may be reluctant to adopt one on
its own.
This may be especially true in most non-medical
malpractice cases because there will be little reliable evidence upon
which a fact finder could base its finding as to the chance of
survival.
We have seen that Commonwealth courts are much more
willing than United States courts to apply loss of a chance where
economic losses are involved. This is true whether other physical
harm is present or not. This phenomenon is difficult to explain.
Professor Waddams suggests that Anglo-Canadian courts are more
willing to estimate losses based on hypothetical facts because of the
decline in the use of juries."' While distrust of juries is a plausible
explanation for why courts that do not use juries have adopted
different rules, it is not clear that the distrust itself is justified.
Distrust of juries could rest on one of two grounds. The first is
the belief that juries are inherently less capable of making estimates
based on probability than judges. It is not clear that there is a valid
basis for this ground. A recent study of fact-finding ability in
general suggests that judges are not much more reliable as fact
finders than juries." Present studies do not focus specifically on the
ability ofjudges and juries to estimate probabilities. Perhaps future
studies will clarify this issue.
The second ground for distrusting juries is that they will have
less experience estimating probabilities than judges. This is
because in jurisdictions that use juries, each case is decided by a
278. David Hamer, 'Chance Would Be a Fine Thing. Proofof Causationand
Quantum in an Unpredictable World, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 557, 614-15 (1999).
In 1998 a trial judge applied an inference of causation created by McGhee v.
National Coal Board, 3 All E.R. 1008 (Eng. ILL. 1972), to a lawsuit against the
government brought by 100,000 ex-coal miners for chest injuries linked to
exposure to coal dust. Jane Stapleton, Scientific and Legal Approaches to
Causation,in CAUSATION IN LAW AND MEDICIME (D. Mendelson & I. Freckelton,
eds., forthcoming 2001). The case settled for two billion pounds, an amount
larger than the government received from sales associated with the
privatization of the coal industry. Id
279. WADDAMtS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES, supra note 61, at 113.30.
280. Social science research has identified five cognitive illusions that lead
jurors to make errors. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind:
Heuristics and Biases, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001). These are anchoring

effects, framing effects, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and
egocentric bias. Id. A recent empirical study demonstrates that judges suffer
from these same illusions when they act as fact finders, although judges

"expressed slightly less vulnerability to two of the five illusions than laypersons
and other experts." Id. These two illusions are framing effects and the
representativeness heuristic. Whether judges reduced vulnerability to these
two illusions gives them a significant advantage in estimating probabilities of
future events and hypothetical events is unknown.
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new jury without reference to how similar cases have been decided
by other juries. In jurisdictions that do not employ juries, judges
become experienced in estimating probabilities by virtue of routinely
performing that function in the cases that they try. Furthermore,
published reports of opinions give them some knowledge of how
other judges have performed that function in similar cases. In
addition, trial judges may get some useful feedback concerning the
quality of their estimates from the appellate courts that handle
appeals from their decisions. Whether this kind of experience and
feedback truly makes judges superior estimators of probability is
unknown. Perhaps future empirical studies examining this issue
will shed some light on the question.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has searched for non-arbitrary limiting principles
that would permit courts to use loss of a chance, where appropriate,
without fear that the doctrine will expand into a general theory of
probabilistic causation. The Article first examined the major policy
rationales for loss of a chance. The examination revealed that
neither the "chance has value" theory nor considerations of fairness
based on difficulty of proof were helpful in restricting the doctrine.
The autonomy theory does provide principled restrictions. It
limits probabilistic causation to cases where a defendant engages in
an undertaking or makes a misrepresentation. Furthermore, by
requiring plaintiff to prove detrimental reliance on the undertaking
or misrepresentation, the theory precludes applying probabilistic
causation to the question of what the plaintiff would have done
(whether the plaintiff would have relied on the undertaking or
misrepresentation). A drawback of the autonomy theory is that it is
useful as a limiting principle only if courts adopt it for the purpose
of protecting autonomy rather than as a subterfuge for employing
probabilistic causation. Courts to date have shown little interest in
granting expanded protection to autonomy.
The policy of promoting efficient deterrence also gives principled
guidance.
Efficiency considerations suggest that probabilistic
causation should be employed in recurring miss cases and in
proportional risk recovery cases involving losses that can be insured
against. Such cases are likely to be rather small in number. In
addition, in the kinds of cases where tortfeasors often escape
liability, deterrence may be enhanced by using the relaxed causation
approach to hold defendants liable for all of plaintiffs harm.
The most workable approach is to use the case-specific policy
considerations identified by Professor Malone for deciding when to
lower plaintiffs burden of proving causation of traditional damage.
Yet, except in medical malpractice cases, even this is problematic
because of the lack of good statistical evidence upon which to base a
finding of the probability of causation. Furthermore, application of
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probabilistic causation in these cases would operate to plaintiffs
disadvantage, producing smaller recoveries than the relaxed
causation approach that courts presently use.
The Commonwealth courts often apply loss of a chance in
economic loss cases. In this respect they are more adventurous than
United States courts. Yet their inability to find non-arbitrary ways
to limit the issues to which the doctrine applies raises questions
about the soundness of applying the doctrine broadly to all economic
loss cases.

HeinOnline -- 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 655 2001

HeinOnline -- 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 656 2001

